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ABSTRACT
Component inspection is an important part of the facilities
management process, especially as repair projects play an increasing role
in the life of public facilities management organizations. The decisions
facility owners make with regard to component inspection effect the
eventual success of their major facility repair projects.
This thesis uses a total cost approach to evaluate the effect
component inspection methods have on facility repair projects. This
problem is examined by comparing the penalty cost of inadequate component
inspection to the costs of alternate component inspection methods that
could have minimized the penalty cost. A general framework is developed
to classify the errors that occur in component inspection and predict the
penalty costs.
Six major facility repair projects in which inadequate component
inspection led to penalty costs are presented and analyzed. The evidence
from these cases shows that owners should pursue more costly and more
accurate component inspection methods. The reduction in penalty costs due
to increased accuracy outweighs the added cost so that the total cost is
less. These cases also point to the usefulness of automated non-contact
component inspection methods in this application.
The evidence presented in this thesis supports the development of a
component inspection strategy by facility owners that considers alternate
component inspection methods as part of the design of facility repair
projects. An understanding of the penalty cost concepts presented here
will be useful to owners in the design of a component inspection
strategy.
Thesis Supervisor: Kenneth R. Maser
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The management of this country's infrastructure is a growing problem
that will consume the talents of civil engineers well into the future.
The tools and methods used to create our vast inventory of infrastructure
facilities are not entirely useful for the newly emerging requirement to
maintain what has been constructed. It is important that new methods and
tools be developed to aid facility managers in making the decisions that
will effect how billions in infrastructure reconstruction funds will be
spent in the ensuing years. Recently developed technologies in sensors,
computers and electronics could be used to aid the infrastructure
reconstruction effort. However, these technologies have not been fully
employed in this effort due to the lack of a profit motive [ 1 ] . This
thesis will look at the application of these technologies to one portion
of the infrastructure reconstruction process - major facility repair
projects - to see if a profit motive in terms of a savings to the owner
exists.
1.1 Overview Of The Problem
During the operational lifetime of a constructed facility the
facility deteriorates and a certain amount of repair and maintenance work
must be done to the facility to keep it operational and performing its
intended purpose for the user. A number of terms are used to refer to
this work; rehabilitation, renovation, repair and maintenance are just a
few. In this thesis it will simply be referred to as "repair". If this
7

repair work is to be accomplished by contract the owner must write a set
of contract documents to describe the work and provide enough information
so contractors can estimate and bid on the work. After the contract is
awarded and the work begins, all too frequently it is discovered that the
nature of the work was incorrectly described in the contract documents.
The work actually required is different than that described in the
contract documents. At this point the owner must take corrective action,
usually by issuing a contract change, and accept the associated
consequences of incorrectly describing the repair work that is required.
The consequences of these errors are varied, however they usually manifest
themselves in the form of project delays and additional costs.
This scenario is not unusual for anyone involved in the facilities
management or the construction contracting business. It happens all to
frequently. What is unusual is that little investigation has been done
into the relationship between the cost of collecting more accurate
information describing the work and the effects and costs of incorrectly
describing the repair work. This is especially true with regard the
collection of information for facility repair projects where this
information is included in the contract documents to describe the nature
of the work and forms the basis for the contractor's bid and the
contractual agreement for the execution of the work. This activity is
called component inspection or CI. Component inspection is different from
condition assessment where information is collected to form the basis for
a decision to select a certain project for execution. Research is ongoing
to address the value of condition assessment information when making the
repair or replace decision for a facility component in terms of the
consequences of a wrong decision [2]. However, once the decision has been

made to execute a facility repair project, how much should be spent to
collect information for inclusion in the contract documents to describe
the nature of the work?
The purpose of this thesis is to look at this recurrent scenario and
examine the effect inadequate component inspection has on facility repair
projects. This will be accomplished by determining the relationship
between the cost of incorrectly describing the nature of the repair work
and the cost of the component inspection methods that could better
describe the repair work. This relationship will be analyzed to see if
the cost of incorrectly describing the repair work can be reduced by
selecting more costly component inspection methods, especially non-contact
automated sensing technologies. With this insight, this thesis will
examine how this relationship could be used to develop owner policies and
guidelines for component inspection that could reduce the effects of
incorrectly describing facility repair work.
This thesis will concentrate on that portion of facilities management
that involves the repair of existing facility components by contract. In
particular it will be concerned with the collection of information that
will be used in the contract documents to describe the nature of the
repair work. This thesis will also be concerned with the contract changes
and impacts that result when the work is incorrectly described in the
contract documents.
1.2 Research Approach
This thesis will look at the facilities management process to see
where this problem fits into the process as a whole. This discussion
9

will examine the decisions owners make in the design and execution of
facility repair projects and how these decisions effect component
inspection. This discussion will look at errors in the component
inspection process that lead to changes in the contract and additional
costs that otherwise would not have been incurred.
The thesis will examine several facility repair projects in which
contract changes were caused by errors in component inspection. These
changes resulted in additional costs to the owner that could have been
avoided if there had not been an error in component inspection.
These additional costs, which are called penalty costs, will be
defined and discussed later in the thesis. The thesis will examine their
nature and how they can be identified. A general framework will be
developed to examine the relationship between errors that occur in the
component inspection process and the penalty costs that result. The
purpose of this framework is to be able to predict the penalty costs
a priori from the known errors that occur in the component inspection
process.
The case studies will be further analyzed to determine the
relationship between the penalty costs that occurred on the project and
the cost of alternate component inspection methods. This will be done by
comparing the penalty costs to the cost of more accurate component
inspection methods that would be useful in reducing the penalty costs due
to their increased accuracy in describing the work. From this analysis
the thesis will attempt to draw conclusions about: 1) the benefit of
employing more costly and more accurate component inspection methods, and
2) the policies that owners should adopt to minimize total cost (penalty
cost plus component inspection costs). These cases will also be analyzed
10

to see if they support the validity of the framework and show that it is
useful in predicting penalty costs for facility repair projects based on
errors in the component inspection process.
This thesis will restrict its discussion to two specific types of
facilities; airfield pavements and concrete bridge decks. These two
facilities were selected because they lend themselves to inspection by
non-traditional techniques for component inspection such as non-contact
automated sensing methods. They also seem to be facilities where the
effects of errors in the component inspection process are pronounced in
terms of the amount of change order work that results from these repair
projects. Airfields and bridge decks also have many similarities:
- Both are generally owned by public or pseudo public agencies whose
procurement and construction contracting procedures are inflexible and
restricted by regulation.
- Both are horizontal facilities where the propensity for water and
chlorides to penetrate the pavement surface is greater than a vertical
facility.
- Both are made of concrete and/or asphalt.
- Both are operationally critical to their users. In the case of a bridge
deck it is the critical link in a network of other facilities (roads) that
is essential to the serviceability (capacity) of the network. In the case
of an airfield it is critical to the serviceability of the airfield and in
the case of military airfields it is particularly critical to the
operational mission of the air base and national security.
11

- Both types of facilities constitute such a large capital investment that
there is normally no redundant facilities. The additional cost of any
redundancy, through either another facility or additional capacity, is not
justified by the downtime associated with the need to perform repair work
on the facility.
- Many of these facilities were built 10 - 30 years ago and they are now
in need of major repair. The construction methods and materials used at
the time they were built did not have the benefit of the years of
deterioration history available today.
Airfield pavements and concrete bridge decks also differ in some
respects. Although both are expansive in nature, airfield pavements tend
to be larger in area than bridge decks. Both the top and the bottom of
bridge decks are generally exposed to the elements, whereas only the top
surface of airfields are exposed. Airfields are supported by a subgrade
material whereas, bridge decks are supported by the substructure of the
bridge
.
Ultimately, after examining the important issues surrounding
component inspection for two types of facility components, airfield
pavements and bridge decks, the arguments advanced by this thesis
regarding component inspection may be used to draw some parallels to the
methods that should be used for other facility components where repair
work is planned. The relationships developed in this thesis may be useful
as a tool to design or select a component inspection strategy for a
facility component repair projects in general. This could eventually help
facility managers to look ahead and anticipate the effect their decisions
regarding component inspection would have on a facility repair project.
12

1.3 Overview of remaining chapters
Chapter Two will introduce this investigation, describe its place in
the facilities management process and highlight those aspects of the
process that are important for further discussion in this thesis. This
includes repair work, component inspection and contract changes as a part
of the facilities management process.
Chapter Three will discuss repair work as it specifically applies to
airfield pavements and concrete bridge decks. It will cover the defects
that occur in these facility components, the repair methods that are
employed and the component inspection methods that are used. Chapter Four
will present actual cases where there have been changes in facility repair
contracts caused by errors in the component inspection process. These
cases will show the penalty costs associated with these errors. Chapter
Five will discuss contract change orders in general and the penalty costs
that result from incorrectly describing the nature of the repair work.
This chapter will cover the various costs involved; agency, user and
political costs and how each is effected by an error in describing the
repair work.
Chapter Six will present the component defect analysis (CDA)
framework as a method of examining the errors that occur in describing the
nature of repair work to be accomplished by contract and the penalty costs
that result from those errors.
Chapter Seven will return to the cases in Chapter Four and present
more data ooncerning the component inspection methods actually used and
their costs. The data from these cases will be used to analyze the costs
of alternate methods versus the benefit of more correctly describing the
13

repair work in the contract documents. In Chapter Eight the thesis will
review the evidence presented and draw conclusions as to the value of
increased costs for component inspection, the use of newer non-contact
automated component inspection methods and the the owner policies that are
needed to minimize penalty costs for facility repair projects. This
analysis will also show how appropriate the component defect analysis
framework is for illustrating the effects of incorrectly describing
facility component defects.
CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES:
[1] Maser, K.R. , "Sensors for Infrastructure Assessment", Proceeding of
ASCE workshop, Civil Engineering In the 21st Century . 11-14 November 87
Williamsburg, VA.
[2] Humplick, F. , McNeil, S., Ramaswamy, R. , "The Role of Uricertainty in
the Management of Infrastructure Facilities", .U.S. Army Research Office




SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION: COMPONENT INSPECTION AND
THE FACILITIES MANAGEMENT PROCESS
This chapter will describe the scope of this thesis within the
framework of the facilities management process. This chapter will
introduce repair work, component inspection and contract change orders as
key aspects of the facilities management process and show the relationship
between them.
Existing facilities must be repaired from time to time. This
requirement leads to the need to prepare contract documents describing the
nature of the repair work for bidding purposes. These contract documents
must include information regarding the deteriorated state of the facility
component. In order to collect this information owners must make
decisions regarding the component inspection methods that will be
employed. These decisions effect the contract changes and the
contractor's bid price such that the ultimate success of a project is many
times determined by the decisions that are made at the outset of the
project with regard to component inspection.
2.1 Component inspection
Component inspection is the process that occurs during the design of
a facility repair project in which information is gathered about the state
of deterioration of a facility component for inclusion in the contract
documents. This component inspection information must correctly describe
the nature of the repair project because it is used by the contractor to
15

estimate the project and prepare his bid. It tells the contractor what
type of work he must do and how much there is. Component inspection
information also forms the basis for any contract changes that may result
later in the project. It is also used by repair project designers to
determine the method of repair to specify in the contract documents.
The term "component inspection" as used here should not be confused
with "condition assessment" or "site investigation". Where component
inspection is concerned with a particular component of a facility,
condition assessment is normally associated with gathering information
about the state of deterioration of a facility as a whole for use in the
network level decision making process in which one project is selected for
execution over another. Both condition assessment and component
inspection are concerned with existing facilities. However, they are
aimed at different levels of detail and the information will be used for
different purposes. One can draw an analogy to the difference between
condition assessment and component inspection, and the difference between
schematic drawings and construction drawings. Just as schematic drawings
are not sufficient to build a building, condition assessment information
is not sufficient to execute a facility repair project.
Site investigation has to do with new construction. It is typically
a term that refers to the gathering of information about geological




2.2 Categories of facility owners
This section will define several categories of facility owners and
discuss why the focus of this thesis is on one particular category of
owner; the informed public owner.
Facility owners can be categorized in several different ways:
- public or private
- informed or uninformed
Public owners are usually governmental bodies that are by definition
nonprofit. On the other hand, an example of a private owner would be
either a manufacturing corporation or a university. Private owners are
usually smaller than public owners on an individual basis. The term
informed owner simply means that the owner has an in-house facilities
management staff and does not have to rely on outside consultants for all
of their facilities management support.
There are several reasons why this thesis will focus on informed
public owners. First, public owners are effected to a greater degree than
private owners by errors made in describing the nature of the repair
work. This is due to the contracting restrictions that public owners have
that set them apart from private owners. Public owners must award to the
lowest bidder; price is the primary consideration. The cooperative
attitude of the contractor with regard to changes is not a factor they can
consider. This requirement makes the need to correctly describe the
nature work through the selection of the most appropriate component




Secondly, informed owners tend to have greater inventory of
facilities, and consequently their own facilities management staff that
can make policy decisions regarding the selection of component inspection
methods. Uninformed owners, on the other hand, tend to have a smaller
inventory of facilities so the value of selecting the appropriate
component inspection methods for their projects is less. Additionally,
since they must rely on outside sources for advice regarding the
development of contract documents and the appropriate component inspection
methods for their projects there is little opportunity to implement new
policies regarding what component inspection methods should be employed.
Although many informed public owners also hire outside consultants to
design repair projects, they have a staff that oversees the work and
provides policy direction and approval of the component inspection methods
that are employed. For this reason they have a greater opportunity to
implement the component inspection policies.
Thirdly, public owners are performing increasing amounts of repair
work as opposed to new work so component inspection is becoming more
important to them. In the past when new construction was the predominant
consideration, owners were concerned with the selection of site
investigation methods and how this effected the cost of their new project
construction. However, now that repair work is becoming a greater part of
the work effort it is natural that these same organizations should begin
to ask similar questions with regard to component inspection as they did
with site investigation. In a way site investigation is to new work as
component inspection is to repair work. Numerous studies in the past have
discussed the effects of site investigation on new construction and made
recommendations as to how to improve the decisions surrounding site
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investigation procedures [3] [4] [5]. This thesis will attempt to look at
these same decisions for component inspection.
However, this is not to say that the arguments advanced by this
thesis will not be of interest to facility owners in other categories,
quite the opposite is true. This restriction on the category of owner
simply means that the discussion will be tailored to the facilities
management environment of the informed public owner.
2.3 Facilities Management process - Objectives
One of the primary objectives of a facilities management organization
is to keep the existing facilities at the highest level of serviceability
for the user. The execution of facility repair projects is an integral
part of the facilities management process that supports this objective.
However, the achievement of this objective is hampered by the structure
and bureaucracy of the organizations intended to achieve this objective.
The organizations that are now charged with this objective are in many
cases the same organizations that were developed to construct these
facilities new, and although suited for this task, they are not the best
suited to perform their emerging repair objective [ 6 ]
.
This issue is especially true when one looks at the effectiveness of
these organizations in dealing with the decision to select component
inspection methods to be employed in the design of these repair projects.
Selecting component inspection methods is becoming more important with the
increasing quantity of repair work needed. The U.S. Military, as one of
the largest single consumers of construction services, now spends more on
repair than on new construction [7].
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Facility management organizations in the public sector, in general
have not established policies to deal with their increasing need for
component inspection. They have not developed a component inspection
strategy to use when designing and preparing bid documents for their major
repair contracts. As these organizations transition from a period where
new construction was their main emphasis to a period where reconstruction
of existing facilities is a greater portion of their total effort they
need to change their investigative techniques accordingly.
In selecting a component inspection method to employ, these
organizations tend to only look at the additional design cost. They do
not look at the impact of inadequate component inspection in terms of
change order costs, project delay and the political cost of loss of
credibility to the facilities organization. Considering the increasing
importance of repair work to these public agencies it is surprising that
more effort has not been directed towards the establishment of component
inspection policies to be used in the design of facility repair projects.
The ability of facilities management organizations to achieve their
objectives is also impacted by the pressure that facilities management
organizations receive to force them to keep facilities operational. The
users want the facilities in good condition, but operational pressures
prevent them from allocating adequate time for repair. For this reason it
becomes imperative that the facility owners find ways to achieve their
objective and minimize the effect on the user. This includes both methods
of component inspection to determine the nature of the repair work and
ways of doing the work. Research that is ongoing to find materials and
methods for reconstruction that could speed the actual repair effort.
20

This thesis is interested in examining the value of new methods for
component inspection to support this repair effort.
2.4 Facilities management process - Decisions
In the course of identifying, designing and executing major facility
repair projects in support of the objectives of a facilities management
organization there are a number of decisions that must be made. These
decision are generally made at two levels: the network level and the
project level.
Decisions at the network level involve prioritizing and selecting a
group of facilities repair projects for funding and execution from a
larger number of available projects. The decision to repair or replace a
facility component is made at this point in the process. Optimally,
decisions at this level are based on the facility condition information,
environmental conditions and cost data that have been collected to support
these decisions [ 8 ]
.
This next section will examine the decisions made at the project
level that are relevant to this thesis.
2.4.1 Project level decisions
Project level decisions involve the analysis and selection of the
repair alternatives that will be applied to each of the projects selected
above for execution. Optimally, these decisions should be based on life
cycle cost analysis using actual and predicted component deterioration
21

information and cost data that has been collected to support these
decisions
.
Eventually, at the project level, an individual project and a repair
alternative are selected for execution. For the purposes of this thesis
it will be assumed that the decision to select this individual project was
made correctly and the uncertainties associated with this decision have
been accounted for prior to this point in the process. This is important
because the purpose of this thesis is to look at the effect of decisions
made after an individual project has been selected.
Additionally, this thesis is only concerned with projects where
repair of the component has been selected, as opposed to replacement.
This is because the decisions an owner must make with regard to component
inspection are more relevant to repair projects than replacement
projects. For example, if the project calls for the complete replacement
of a concrete bridge deck the nature of the work is quite easily described
with minimal information concerning the deteriorated state of the existing
deck. On the other hand, if a bridge deck, for example, is to be repaired
knowledge about the location and quantities of deck delaminations is an
important element of the nature of the work [9] [10].
After an individual project has been selected for execution several
decisions must be made regarding how that individual repair project will
be executed. This thesis will focus on two of these decisions. They are
as follows:
1) If it is to be done by contract, what type of contractual
arrangement between owner and contractor should be selected for use?
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2) In preparing the contract documents and doing the design for this
repair project what component inspection methods should be selected
for use?
The next sections of this chapter will discuss each of these
decisions and the considerations that should be taken into account when
making these decisions.
2.4.2 Select the contractual arrangement
This thesis is only concerned with those repair projects that are
selected to be done by contract. This is because the selection of a
component inspection method is not as critical if the work is to be done
in-house. Basically their are three types of contracts to select from: 1)
lump-sum price, 2) unit price or 3) cost-plus [11]. There are other types
available, but they are simply combinations of these.
The decision to select of one type of contract over another is
greatly dependent on the owner's procurement regulations. For example,
cost-plus contracts are very rarely used by public agencies due to their
procurement regulations and the opportunity for abuse. Additionally, the
decision is dependent on the degree to which the exact nature and quantity
of the work can be determined. If the scope of the repair project,
including the nature and the quantity of the work, are known with
certainty then a lump-sum contract can be used. If the nature of the work
is known, but the quantities are not known then the a unit price contract
should be selected. Many times lump-sum and unit price work items are




certainty is bid on a lump-sum basis and the items of work in which there
is some uncertainty as to quantity of work are bid as a unit price basis
[11].
Unit price work is awarded based on an estimated quantity of work.
This estimate is provided by the owner and all bidders use the same
estimate so as to form a basis for comparing bids. The contractor is
obligated to perform the required quantities of work even though they may
differ from the estimated quantities. Depending on the procurement
regulations of the owner the contract may include a provision stating that
if the estimated and the actual quantities differ significantly new unit
prices will be negotiated. The degree of variance at which this
adjustment occurs varies from owner to owner. It can be based on the
variance of each individual line item or on the total contract price.
These clauses are a part of the general conditions the owner issues
with each contract and do not generally vary between individual projects.
For example, the state of Vermont uses 25% of the total contract price as
the threshold. The federal government uses 15% of an individual line item
as the threshold. For the purposes of this thesis this threshold will be
called the contract variance threshold (CVT)
.
The contract variance threshold will determine the accuracy with
which the quantities of work must be estimated in order to avoid any
additional costs associated with changing the quantity. When repair
projects encounter deterioration that differs beyond the allowable
contract variance threshold this results in a needed change to the
contract and the associated costs must be absorbed by the owner.
Determining the estimated quantity of work is the role of component
inspection and decisions by the owner with regard to the component
24

inspection methods used in the project design can have an effect on the
changes caused by exceeding the contract variance threshold.
2.4.3 Select the component inspection method
During the design of the repair project and the development of
contract documents the owner must select a component inspection method.
In selecting a component inspection method for a particular repair project
owners should consider the following factors [10]:
- the needed accuracy of the component inspection method
- the cost of the component inspection method
- the degree of user reliance on the facility
- the priority and schedule of the actual repair effort
In considering the cost of component inspection owners should
evaluate the true cost of the component inspection method for a repair
project. If efforts are made to cut the cost of designing a project
through selecting component inspection methods that cost less and provide
less accuracy this will show up as changes to the contract, project delays
and embarrassment to the agency. Owners must be concerned with the effect
these decisions to cut the cost of component inspection have on the total
cost of the project.
One way in which owners reduce the cost of component inspection is to
utilize in-house engineers to perform the component inspection. "Ihis
decision fails to consider the needed component inspection accuracy for a
particular repair project in comparison to the capabilities of these
personnel. Although these in-house personnel may be competent in their
field of expertise, component inspection for a major facility repair
25

project, that occurs say every 15 years, is many times beyond their
capabilities. They are simply not able to provide the needed accuracy.
The cases to be presented in Chapter Seven will show examples of this.
If the skills required for design and component inspection are beyond
the capabilities of the in-house engineers, or if expensive or
sophisticated tools are needed, the owner should consider an outside
consultant to perform the design. In the case of federal work the design
procurement rules allow consultants to be compensated for the fair and
reasonable costs associated with using expensive capital intensive
component inspection equipment for the project [ 12 ]
.
Because the component inspection process is concerned with existing
facilities the selection of a component inspection method is greatly
effected by the speed of the component inspection method and the users
desire to keep using the facility. The amount of downtime that can be
scheduled for a component inspection activity is sometimes very limited
and will determine what component inspection methods are acceptable in
terms of how long it takes to perform the component inspection.
In considering the scheduling of the repair project the component
inspection decisions made by owners must address the fact that
deterioration is time dependent. When a repair project is delayed from
starting, the deterioration is allowed to continue and when the work
finally begins the designed repair may be unsuitable for the current
condition of the component. Therefore, owners must select component
inspection methods that identify the work at a point in time, but also
address the fact that deterioration may change the work. This is
particularly important with public owners where there may be a
considerable delay before the execution of a repair project.
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In summary, the decisions made with regard to component inspection
are important to the overall success of an owner's facilities repair
projects. Specifically the decisions made at this point in the facilities
management process with regard to the selection of component inspection
methods will affect:
1) the contractor's bid price through the application of contingency
amounts.
2) the magnitude and quantity of changes to the contract as a result
of inadequate component inspection.
Although the nature of increased bid prices due to component
inspection decisions will be discussed in the next section, the emphasis
of this thesis will be on the effect component inspection decisions have
on contract changes.
2.5 Bid prices versus component inspection decisions
Bid prices for facility repair projects are effected by decisions
made with regard to component inspection since component inspection forms
the basis for the information in the contract documents that describes the
nature of the repair work. The contractor uses this information to
determine the quantities of materials, the labor hours and the equipment
required to accomplish the work. This information is also used to
determine the sequence of the work, the project schedule and ultimately
how to optimize profit [13].
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Hie first step any contractor takes in bidding work is to become
thoroughly familiar with the contract documents in order to fully
understand the overall job picture and the requirements set forth by the
owner [14]. The contract documents must provide adequate information for
the contractor to bid on the job [9], If the information in the contract
documents is incomplete then the contractor may be less inclined to bid on
the work because of the possible problems that could result. Contractors
prefer to avoid projects they know will be a problem. If they choose to
bid, the prudent contractor will increase his bid price with a higher
contingency to cover the uncertainty associated with the incomplete
contract documents [15]. Alternatively, the less than prudent contractor
may not include a contingency and hope to successfully claim for extra
work after award of the contract. In either case, the owner incurs extra
cost and delay in completing the repair project.
Component inspection is used to determine the estimated quantities of
work for both unit price and lump-sum contracts. In unit price contracts,
the contractor is obligated by the contract to provide the actual
quantities of work regardless of the difference between the estimated and
the actual, unless there is variance clause in the contract allowing for
an adjustment in price as discussed earlier. For bidding purposes
however, the amount of contingency he places in his bid will be dependent
on the certainty he feels in the estimated quantities and the existence of
the variance clause allowing for an adjustment in price. He will include
some contingency to cover a change in quantities, but by increasing the
accuracy of the estimates and including a variance clause the owner can
ininimize the amount of contingency [16].
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2.6 Contract changes due to inadequate component inspection
This thesis is concerned with changes that result from inadequate
component inspection. Inadequate component inspection is defined as
occurring when errors in the component inspection process lead to
incorrectly describing the nature of the repair work to such a degree that
a contract change is required to correct the error. A certain degree of
error exists with all component inspection methods. However, inadequate
component inspection does not occur until the error is so great that a
contract change is required to correct the error.
When making decisions regarding component inspection many times
facility owners do not consider potential changes caused by inadequate
component inspection and their impact. If owners could predict the impact
of their component inspection decisions, this information could be used to
help them make more informed decisions regarding component inspection for
major facility repair projects.
This thesis will attempt to shed light on the decisions owners make
in the component inspection process and the effects of these decisions.
The errors that can be made in the component inspection process will be
examined and an attempt will be made to quantify their impact in terms of
dollars
.
The term "penalty costs" will be used to describe this impact or the
cost of changes caused by inadequate component inspection. Penalty costs
are defined as the additional cost of doing the repair project as a result
of changes caused by incorrectly describing the nature and the quantity of
the work in the contract documents.
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Penalty costs should not be equated to the total cost of the change
order. Generally, only a portion of the total change order costs are
penalty costs. Especially in the case of adding work to the contract
where the owner would have paid some part of the change order costs to
have the changed work done if it had been described correctly in the
original contract documents. Penalty costs are only those costs that are
attributed to changing the contract work after award.
Also included in this definition of penalty costs are the additional
agency cost of administering a contract change, the user cost associated
with any delay in completion of the project and any additional redesign
costs. Penalty costs will be discussed and developed in more detail in
Chapter Five.
Many times these penalty costs are overlooked when selecting a
component inspection methods for a particular project. Changes due to
inadequate component inspection are preventable and the first step towards
prevention is to understand the effect of inadequate component inspection.
2.7 Relationship between component inspection costs and penalty costs
This section will present the conceptual qualitative relationship
between the cost of component inspection and the penalty cost associated
with inadequate component inspection.
This relationship is shown in Figure 2.1. The cost of component
inspection information is shown as a function of the percent error of the
component inspection information. Different component inspection methods
will have different costs and yield various levels of accuracy in
information. These points connected together would produce the component
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COMPONENT INSPECTION COST AND PENALTY COST
VERSUS









inspection cost curve shown. Methods that yield more accurate information
(less percent error) tend to have a greater cost.
The penalty cost curve is also shown as a function of the percent
error in the component inspection information. As the percent error of
the component inspection information increases, the magnitude of the
penalty costs will increase and this will produce the penalty cost curve.
The total cost curve is a sum of the penalty cost and the component
inspection cost at each level of accuracy of component inspection
information. There is a minimum total cost which corresponds to the
optimum component inspection method that yields a certain percent error of
information and a certain penalty cost at the same percent error.
Through examining and understanding this relationship owners' could
make decisions about the component inspection methods that are most
appropriate for a project in terms of the total cost.
2.8 Summary
Repair projects play an increasing role in the life of public
facilities management organizations. The unique aspects of repair work
and the organizational restrictions that public owners must operate under
require an examination of the component inspection decisions used in the
implementation of these repair projects with the aim of minimizing the
penalty costs associated with contract changes.
In order to accomplish repair work by contract the owner must prepare
contract documents for the contractor to use in bidding the work. These
documents must describe the nature of the work in enough detail so that
the contractor can estimate the work and provide a bid. Component
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inspection occurs during the design to obtain the information required for
the contract documents so the contractor can bid the work.
This chapter has discussed the importance of component inspection to
the overall facility repair project effort in terms of its effect on
contract changes and bid prices.
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COMPONENT INSPECTION AND REPAIR METHODS FOR DEFECTS IN
CONCRETE BRIDGE DECKS AND AIRFIELD PAVEMENTS
The purpose of this chapter is to look at repair work in more detail
as it pertains to the two types of facilities this thesis will be
concerned with; airfield pavements and concrete bridge decks. This
chapter will discuss the typical defects that occur in these facility
components, the methods of repair employed for these defects and the
component inspection methods that can be used to identify these defects.
3.1 Definition of repair work
For the purposes of this thesis repair is defined as anything but the
replacement of the entire facility or the entire facility component. If a
section of an airfield pavement or a concrete bridge deck is removed and
new material put in its place this would be repair, not replacement.
Replacing small sections or localized replacement in order to repair the
component as a whole is considered to be repair for the proposes of this
thesis. Even the replacement of an entire slab of a Portland cement
concrete pavement is considered repair. Additionally since this thesis is
concerned with work that is done by contract, the emphasis will be on
major repair projects, as opposed to routine repair work which is many
times within the capability of in-house forces or involves work of a
recurring or routine nature. What will be referred to as repair work in
this thesis may otherwise be known as reconstruction, renovation,
rehabilitation or major maintenance. The exact term used is not so
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important. The important issue is to understand is that the definition
does not include the wholesale replacement of a facility or a facility
component. The issue of component inspection is much more important to
repair projects than it is to replacement projects.
3.1.2 Key aspects of repair projects for existing facilities
Facility owners are constantly reminded that the facilities they are
charged with repairing are occupied. They must keep this fact in mind
when they plan repair projects and select component inspection methods.
The effect these activities have on the user of the facility should be a
key consideration in their planning. As discussed previously bridges and
airfield are critical links in transportation networks and denying the
user access is a decision that is not lightly made. Component inspection
methods must be selected that minimize this downtime to the user. Repair
work must be scheduled around the users requirements or alternative
arrangements must be made to accommodate the user. These are key
considerations for all existing facilities in which repair work is planned
and not unique to airfield and bridge decks.
3.2 Bridge deck defects and repair methods
Concrete bridge decks provide the interface between the substructure
of the bridge and the user. There are basically two types of concrete
bridge decks. The first are bare concrete decks in which the traffic
rides directly on the concrete. The concrete is a structural part of the
bridge and is exposed to the elements. This is a disadvantage in that it
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contributes to its accelerated deterioration, however it is also a benefit
because it allows direct visual inspection of the concrete surface.
The second type of deck is the asphalt covered deck in which a
wearing course of asphaltic concrete has been applied over the top of the
concrete. This wearing course is not a structural part of the bridge and
contributes to the dead load. Between this wearing course and the
concrete there may be a membrane. Asphalt wearing courses greatly
complicate the inspection of a bridge deck. Defects are hidden from view
and some types of defects are indiscernible from others. For example,
delaminations in the concrete are mistaken for debonding between the
asphalt and the concrete layer [ 1 ]
.
With the exception of debonding the defects found in either covered
or uncovered concrete decks are the same. The following is a description
of the principle defects and their causes:
Spalling is a hole in the surface of the concrete bridge deck where a
delamination has progressed to a point that the concrete above it is
broken away from the deck.
Scaling is the flaking or pealing away of the cement paste at the surface
of the concrete. It is caused by the action of the freeze thaw cycle and
the use of deicing chemicals. It can progress to the extent that the
surface aggregates are loosened up.
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Delaminaticn is a separation along the plane parallel to the outer surface
of the concrete. It is usually located at the elevation of the top layer
of reinforcing bars and is caused by the increased pressure associated
with the corrosion of the reinforcement.
Debonding is a separation at the interface between the structural concrete
bridge deck and the asphalt wearing course. Although technically not a.
defect of the concrete bridge deck, if it is allowed to remain it will
eventually become a pothole and degrade the performance of the bridge and
allow the membrane, if there is one, to become damaged and degrade its
performance.
Punky concrete is a term used more to describe several defects than it is
a separate defect. This term is used to describe concrete that is not as
strong as it should be and needs to be removed in the repair process.
This loss of strength can be caused be delaminations or scaling. In any
event it represents deteriorated concrete due to a number of mechanisms
including infiltration of salt and water though micro cracks.
The methods of repair for each of these defects usually involves
removal of deteriorated concrete and replacement with new concrete. The
determination of the extent of the deteriorated concrete is the most
difficult problem in planning a repair of a concrete deck [ 1 ]
.
After all of the areas of unsound material and delaminations have been
removed most agencies employ either the installation of a concrete overlay
or a membrane and an asphalt wearing course. If a concrete overlay is to
be installed then the entire surface should have the top 1/4" scarified to
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provide a good bond. If an overlay is planned the edges of the removed
areas can be made with a chipping hammer at an angle so air pockets are
not produced when the overlay is put down. If a membrane and an asphalt
wearing course are planned then the edges should be cut with a saw. The
saw blade should be tilted slightly into the old concrete to help hold the
new concrete in place. Before fresh concrete is placed the existing
surface must be blast cleaned. This removal method can be used to repair
spalls, delaminations and scaling.
3.3 Airfield pavement defects and repair methods
This section will discuss the defects that occur in airfield
pavements and the repair methods that are commonly employed. There are
two basis types of airfield pavements - flexible and rigid - and the
defects that occur vary depending on the type of pavement. Many times
rigid and flexible pavements will be used in different areas of the same
airfield depending on the purpose for the individual section of pavement
(taxiway, runway, fueling area, parking/maintenance apron). For example,
maintenance and refueling areas are usually made of concrete as opposed to
asphalt to prevent deterioration due to fuel spills [2].
3.3.1 Rigid pavement defects
A rigid pavement structure has two main constituent parts: the
Portland cement concrete (POC) slab and the sub-base course structure.
Joints form the interface between the slabs to allow for the thermal
movement of the slabs [2]. A failure of any of these parts is considered
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a defect in the pavement. The airfield pavement condition survey
procedures used by the Navy identify 15 defects that can occur in rigid
airfield pavements [ 3 ] . A description of these defects is provided in
Appendix A.
3.3.2 Rigid pavement methods of repair
Rigid pavement defects, either individually and in combination, can
be repaired by various methods. Ihe methods for the repair of rigid
pavements include [ 4 ]
:
Localized repairs to specific portions of the rigid pavement. This work
involves the removal of deteriorated areas and the placement of fresh
concrete. This method requires attention to the interface between the new
concrete and the existing pavement that is to remain. This work may be
done on a portion of the slab that also includes a joint. In this case
the joint must be rebuilt as part of the to insure the repaired joint will
function consistent with the remaining portion of the joint.
Asphalt overlays are a method of repairing existing POC pavements. In
order for overlays to be effective they must be designed so that the
existing defects are not reflected through to the new surface. This can
be accomplished by requiring localized repairs to the badly deteriorated
sections of the POC pavement before overlaying and the use of a crack
relief layer between the old POC and the new asphalt wearing surface. The
crack-relief layer provides provides a medium through which differential
movements of the old POC slab cannot be transferred.
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Resurfacing is a repair method in which the existing PCC pavement is
overlain with another POC layer. Various combinations of reinforcing and
bonding interfaces can be designed into the overlay depending on the
desired additional pavement strength and the defects that are present on
the existing pavement.
Reconstruction is a method where the existing pavement is removed and then
either wasted or reused as base course, aggregate or fill. The potential
for reuse of the old pavement depends on the availability of suitable
virgin materials. In areas where quality aggregates are in short supply
this method of repair is becoming more advantageous from a total cost
perspective.
PCC joint and crack sealing is done to prevent surface water seepage into
the joint and the sub-base material, protect joint fillers and to keep
debris out of the joint so it can function properly. Cracks and joints
must be cleaned out before sealers can be applied.
3.3.3 Flexible pavement defects
Flexible pavements have three constituent parts: the surface course,
the base course and the sub-base course. Joints for the purposes of
thermal expansion are not as important as in rigid pavements because the
flexibility of the pavement allows for this movement [2]. The condition
survey procedures used by the Navy identify 16 defects that can occur in
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flexible pavements [ 3 ] . A description of these defects is provided as
Appendix A.
3.3.4 Flexible pavement methods of repair
Flexible pavement defects have various causes such as overloaded,
age, improperly mixed asphalt concrete and user problems such as jet
blast. Regardless of the cause of these defects the following repair
methods can be used to repair these defects either individually or in
combination [5]:
Patching - Two types of patch work are used in the repair of asphalt
pavements. The first is skin patches which are temporary in nature and
involve placing a seal coat over the deteriorated area. The second are
deep patches which involve the removal of the deteriorated asphalt to a
depth of at least 4 inches. The excavation should also extend
horizontally a foot into good pavement surrounding the patched area. The
edges of the excavation should be squared off. If the sub-base material
is good it should be recompacted, and if it is poor or was the cause of
the failure it should be replaced with new material. The edges should
receive a tack coat and the sub-base should receive a prime coat before
new asphalt is placed in the excavating. All types of cracking,




Crack filling - Crack filling is a method of repair that can be used on
all the commonly encountered types of cracks in asphalt. Each crack that
is to be filled must be opened and cleaned. Blowing with air jets and
routing are the two most frequently used cleaning procedures. Both hot
and cold liquid asphalts can be used to fill the crack depending on the
application. The liquid must be fluid enough to flow into the crack.
Asphalt-aggregate mixtures, such as sand slurries are used to fill
especially wide cracks (over 3/8").
An asphalt overlay is a method of repairing asphalt pavements and may be
designed simply to improve the average pavement condition (smoothness) or
it may designed with additional thickness to provide added structural
capacity to the pavement. In either case, measures must be taken to
retard the reflective cracking of defects in the existing pavement. One
way to accomplish this is though the incorporation of a fabric under the
new asphalt layer and to insure that all weak areas are repaired by a deep
patching prior to overlay. This method is normally done after the removal
of a thin layer of the existing asphalt by scarification.
Recycling of asphalt pavements is a method of repair that can be
accomplished in three ways: 1) surface, 2) hot-mix, or 3) cold-mix.
Surface recycling consists of reworking the surface of the old
asphalt pavement to a depth of less than one inch. The pavement is
heated with a mobile combustion chamber and the softened materials




Hot-mix recycling consists of removing the existing asphalt and
stockpiling these materials at a central plant. These old materials
are reheated and combined with new asphalt and aggregates to produce
a hot-mix that is then relayed as a new surface would be.
Cold-mix recycling removes and crushes the existing pavement to a
specified particle size. The crushed pavement material is mixed
without the introduction of heat with an asphalt recycling agent and
new materials to produce what is considered a treated base. This
treated base is placed and compacted and a hot-mix wearing course is
then applied on top.
3.4 Component inspection methods for concrete bridge decks
There are two types of bridge inspections typically performed. The
first is an routine inventory inspection such as the National Bridge
Inventory mandated by the Congress. The second is a more detailed
inspection done when the results of a routine inspection indicate a bridge
is likely to be in need of work and in order to collect information for
the preparation of contract documents [ 1 ] . This thesis is concerned with
the more detailed survey used in the preparation of contract documents.
In general the component inspection method that can be used for this
more detailed survey can be divided into two types which will be called
existing methods and new methods. The existing methods are typified by
being less equipment intensive, based on a lower technology, and generally
taking a longer period of time to perform the component inspection





The existing methods for the component inspection of concrete bridge
decks that are used frequently are described as follows:
Chloride content test is used to determine the concentration of chlorides
from deicing agents that have permeated the concrete. Samples are taken
to determine if the threshold concentration has been reached and at which
locations. Samples are relatively expensive to take since they require a
drilling rig, diamond toothed core drills and lab analysis of the
samples. Unfortunately, the value obtained for each sample is only the
value at that particular point. The test results are somewhat variable
depending on the sample location and associated factors such as how well
the deck is drained [ 1 ]
.
Chain drag is an acoustic technique that allows the user to find
delaminations and areas of unsound concrete. Noise from traffic
interferes with its use. The method is fairly accurate, but it is slow.
On asphalt covered decks it is difficult to tell the difference between
debonding and delamination. Delamtect is another device that can be used
to detect delaminations on bridge decks. It can reportedly detect
delaminations up to 4.5 inches below an asphalt wearing course and up 2.6
inches below a exposed concrete deck. However, using this method,
debonding is also often mistaken as a delamination and this technique is
not as accurate as chain drag [6].
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Visual inspection of the bridge deck is used to locate visible defects
such as spalls, scaling and cracks.
Core samples have the same disadvantages as samples taken for chloride
content. Core samples can detect delamination, debonding, unsound
concrete. Core samples can also be used to confirm the results of other
non-destructive tests. Unfortunately core samples only provide
information about the deck at the point where the sample was taken.
Selective demolition is a method in which a section of the bridge deck is
ripped up to determine its condition. This method is more frequently used
on asphalt covered decks where information is needed about the concrete
that is hidden from view. A small section of asphalt is removed, the
condition of the concrete is noted, sections of the concrete may even be
taken up at this time to see if it is sound. The demolished area is then
repaired with an asphalt patch until the repair work is scheduled.
Electrical resistance testing of membranes is useful for detecting their
integrity if they are installed on the bridge. Any holes in the membrane
that would allow current to flow would allow moisture onto the concrete.
Although this test does not indicate the condition of the deck itself, the
lack of a good membrane would indicate the need for a new one and the
degree to which one might expect the deck to be deteriorated. The




Half-cell potential measures the corrosion activity in the bridge deck.
This test is designated ASTM C876 and is described in detail in the
literature [1]. It requires a hole be drilled in the asphalt wearing
course and the deck membrane. The test is subject to some external
variables such as temperature and the amount of free water on the deck.
The test results sometimes indicate corrosion when that is not the case.
The relationship between half-cell tests, corrosion and defects in a deck
have been established in tests. As the half-cell readings increase the
amount of corrosion and the probability of corrosion being present
increase. However, the half-cell reading is not a measure of the rate of
corrosion, just the presence of corrosion.
3.4.2 New component inspection methods for bridge decks
The following methods were developed in response to the need to
develop new bridge deck evaluation methods. They are described as
follows:
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) is a method based on pulsed microwave
frequency energy that can detect a number of bridge deck defects. It can
detect the thickness of the various layers, the depth of the reinforcement
and it is sensitive to the condition of the concrete and the chloride
content. The method can survey a 1.5 foot wide strip of bridge deck at 2-
10 miles per hour. GPR is fast and non-destructive. However, because of
the great amount of data collected the data processing a reduction costs
are high [7]. A 90% reliability has been obtained in the use of this
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component inspection method to distinguish between sound and deteriorated
concrete [8].
Infrared thermography (IR) can be used to detect delaminated and debonded
areas on bridge decks. IR senses the emission of thermal radiation.
Sound and unsound portions of the deck have differing heat transfer
properties due to the thermal break that is filled with either water or
air. This causes a difference in the amount of thermal radiation that is
emitted. And by sensing differences in thermal radiation are caused by
these defects and show up as with thermal discontinuity. This method is
effected by external variables such as weather. It may confuse surface
defects, patching and discoloration with unsound concrete. It has the
advantage of being fast. It can pass over a deck at 2-10 miles per hour
and survey one lane per pass [7]. In field test this method has
identified 90% of the known delaminations in a concrete bridge deck [ 9 ]
.
3.5 Component inspection methods for airfield pavements
This section will discuss the existing and new component inspection
methods for airfield pavements.
3.5.1 Existing methods
The existing methods methods are described as follows:
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Chain drag is the same test for airfield pavements as described for bridge
decks. This method can also be performed by dropping a metal rod, such as
a reinforcing bar, on end. The accuracy of this method is fairly good,
but it has the disadvantages of being difficult to use with interference
from aircraft engine noise and it is also slow.
Falling weight deflectometers are used to determine the structural
strength of a pavement section. It is primarily used to determine the
remaining allowable capacity of an existing pavement to provide to be used
to determine the required thickness of an overlay. There are several
models of this device, but the all work on the basis of dropping a weight
and imparting an dynamic force onto the pavement. Transducers measure the
applied loads and the displacement of the pavement. There are a number of
other devices such as Dynaflect and Roadrater that are based on the same
principle. Some apply a impulse load and some use a vibratory load [10].
Visual inspection of an airfield pavement is fairly straight forward. The
size and location of defects are noted manually during the survey. Visual
inspection is the basis of the pavement condition survey procedures used
by the Navy. This technique relies on examining a representative sample
of the pavement to determine its overall condition. This is satisfactory
for the purposes of condition assessment, however this information may not
be satisfactory for component inspection purposes. If representative data
is extrapolated to determine the defects that exist on the entire pavement
errors in the amount of work could result [11]. Visual inspection of an
entire airfield is a time consuming and laborious process, much more so
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than visual inspection of a bridge deck because of the greater area
involved.
Test pits are a destructive method of determining the strength of the
existing pavement structure. The paving materials and the sub-base
materials can be tested in place and samples can be taken for lab
testing. California Bearing Ratio (CBR) values can be obtained from this
test. This method is quite time consuming and the test only provides
information regarding the particular location tested.
3.5.2 New methods for the component inspection of airfield pavements
Several new methods are available for the component inspection of
airfield pavements. Some have been adapted from methods that have already
been applied to bridge decks and would be useful for airfield pavements.
They are described as follows:
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) would also be useful to detect the same
defects on airfield pavements. It can detect the thickness of the various
layers, the depth of the reinforcement and it is sensitive to the
condition of the concrete and the chloride content. It can also be used
to detect voids under the pavement [12].
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Infrared thei.iuLxp.aphy (IR) can be used to detect delaminated and debonded
areas in airfield pavements. IR has the advantage of being fast which is
important for airfields where the time allowed for component inspection is
normally restricted. It can survey a 12 foot wide path of pavement at 2-
10 miles per hour [7].
Video imaging is the rapid viewing and recording of a visual inspection of
the pavement. It can be used to detect any of the defects that could be
detected by visual inspection. Its advantage over normal methods of
visual inspection is that a permanent record is made in a short period of
time to be analyzed later. The owner does not have to great periods of
looking at the component and recording the defects. It allows the same
defects to be detected in much less time than manual methods. This record
can then be digitized and processed looking for the same defects a human
inspector would look for only in much less time. This method is
especially useful for facilities where the amount of time available for
component inspection is severely restricted, and although existing methods
would be adequate given enough time, that time is simply not available
[13].
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CONTRACT CHANGES DUE TO INADEOUATE COMPONENT INSPECTION
CASE STUDIES
The purpose of this chapter is to present cases studies where
inadequate component inspection was the cause of change orders in facility
repair projects. The existence of these cases highlight the importance of
this problem and show examples of the penalty costs that are associated
with inadequate component inspection. The cases have been obtained from
informed public owners. The thesis will present three bridge deck cases
and three airfield pavement cases.
4 . 1 Introduction
In discussing each of these cases the following information will be
presented:
1. description of the facility and the scope of the project.
2. award amount, date of award and the duration of the project.
3. schedule constraints due to weather or user requirements.
4. how did the problem of inadequate component inspection arise or
become evident.
5. how was the problem corrected.
6. what was the nature of the penalty costs that occurred due to
changes issued to correct the problem.
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4.2 State of Vermont - Middlesex, Plainfield and Waitsfield bridges
The Middlesex, Plainfield and Waitsfield bridges are located in the
State of Vermont. Their repair was part of the annual bridge repair
program by the Vermont Agency of Transportation.
4.2.1 Scope of project
A contract was awarded on 17 March 1986 for $250K to perform various
items of repair work on these three bridges. The contract completion date
was 1 August 1986. The contract was a unit price contract with
approximately 20 line items of work. The scope of the work was the same
for the three bridges and included various repairs to the bridge deck and
associated work like restriping and joint repairs.
4.2.2 The problem
Of the 20 work items on the bid schedule this discussion will only be
concerned with two: 1) concrete surface prep class 1, and 2) concrete
surface prep class 2. These two work items include removing concrete in
poor condition, preparing the exposed surface and placing new concrete.
Class 1 removal is down to the top mat of reinforcement and class 2
removal is down to at least 3/4" below the top mat of reinforcement.
After the work began it became apparent that the actual quantities of
removal for these two work items were significantly greater than the
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The estimated quantities were determined through the standard bridge
survey procedures employed by the state which include visual inspection
and half-cell tests.
The actual quantities of work required at the completion of the job
were 154% greater than the estimated quantities. This increase combined
with other minor increases and decreases in unit quantities for other work
items caused the final contract price to exceed the bid price based on
estimated quantities by 50% , from $250K to $374K [ 1 ]
.
Although a portion of this increase is due simply to the fact that
there was more work to perform and the owner would have paid this
additional amount even if the quantities of work had been correctly known,
a portion of this increase could have been avoided if the owner had stated
the estimated quantities of work correctly on the contract documents. A




The other penalty costs that occurred in this case are the additional
costs incurred by the owner to administer the changes and claims that
occurred on this project because of the variation in the quantities.
Ihere were also penalty costs of a political nature that occurred on this
project because the contractor finished later than the original completion
date and the agency suffered the embarrassment of not completing the job
on schedule.
4.3 Veteran's Memorial Bridge - Portland, Maine
The Veteran's Memorial Bridge is a four lane bridge carrying U.S.
Route 1 over the Fore River between Portland and South Portland. It
provides for a large daily traffic volume and the timely completion of
this project was important to the users of the bridge.
4.3.1 Scope of project
This bridge repair project called for repairs to the substructure,
concrete bridge deck, railing, lighting and other related work. This
analysis is concerned with the repairs to the bridge deck. The contract
was awarded on 28 June 1984 for $2,428K. The repairs to the bridge deck
accounted for approximately $800K or one-third of this amount. The
contractor had until 1 November 1985 to complete the work.
The contractor began work on the substructure repair first in 1984.
This work was completed over the winter and the deck repairs were begun in
the spring of 1985. The contract included two work items for the removal
and replacement of deteriorated concrete on the deck. The first item,
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which will be called type 1, was removal down to the top layer of
reinforcement. The second item, which will be called type 2, was to below
the top mat of reinforcement.
4.3.2 The problem
After 22% of the deck work was complete it became evident that at the
current rate at which deteriorated concrete was being discovered the
projected actual quantity of concrete to be removed from the deck would
far exceed the estimated quantities. The projected quantity was 35,000
SF. The estimated quantity in the contract was only 6,000 SF. The
estimated quantities were determined by the state using the standard
bridge inspection procedures, including visual inspection, coring and
testing for chloride content.
If the work had proceeded as planned these additional quantities
would have added $348K ($420K - $72K) to the cost of the work based on the
unit prices as shown below. Furthermore, the contractor was intending to
claim an additional $200K to cover the cost of accelerating the work to
finish by November or the same amount to stop the work for the winter and
re-mobilize in the spring of 1986.
REMDVAL EST UNIT EST PROJECTED PROJECTED
TYPE QUANT PRICE COST QUANTITY COST
1 3600 SF 8 $/SF $28,800 21,000 SF $168,000
2 2400 SF 18 $/SF $43,200 14,000 SF $252,000
TOTAL 6000 SF $72,000 35,000 SF $420,000
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At this point the owner directed the contractor to change the method
of removal for the remaining portions of the deck. Instead of continuing
with the spot removal for either type 1 or 2, it was decided to perform
type 1 removal over the entire deck with a milling machine as opposed to
hand methods. And once complete, type 2 removal would be done where
required. Afterwards the entire deck would receive an overlay of 2" of
concrete [2].
This change added $515K to the cost of the contract. Although it is
less than the $548 ($348K + $200K) that would have been added if the
original work had continued, a portion of these costs could still have
been avoided if the contractor had known that milling of the top layer of
concrete was required prior to bidding the work. If the projected
quantity of the deteriorated concrete had been known by the owner the
decision to require the milling of the top layer could have been included
in the contract documents. In this case however, the owner told the
contractor how to do the work after the award of the contract and the
contractor was reimbursed for his cost of doing the work. Therefore, any
cost incentive on the part of the contractor was eliminated and this
contributed to the penalty cost.
If the work had been correctly described in the contract documents
there would have been competitive bidding on the work as it was changed
and the cost of this added work would have been less.
4.4 State of Vermont - Hartland, Hartford and Sharon bridges
These bridges are located in the State of Vermont and their repair
was part of the states' s annual bridge repair program.
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4.4.1 Scope of project
A contract was awarded in the spring of 1987 to perform various
repairs to the decks of three bridges. The original amount of the
contract was $327K. The contract was a unit price contract with
approximately 20 line items of work. This contract was very similar in
the scope of the work as the bridge repair contract in section 4.2 and
included the same two work items for concrete removal as the previous
Vermont case: concrete removal - class 1 and concrete removal - class 2.
4.4.2 The problem
The contractor began work after award of the contract in the spring
of 1987. In two out of the three bridges the estimated quantities were
greater than the actual quantities of work, however the final cost of the
work on each bridge was within 10% of the bid amount. However, for the
Hartland bridge (58A) the actual quantity of work was far in excess of the
estimated quantity and this caused the quantity of concrete removal for
the entire contract to be underestimated by 172%. Class 1 and class 2
removal will be considered together as the same work item since the
contractor bid the same price for each.




Estimated Quant (SY) Actual Quant (SY)
Bridge Class 1 Class 2 TOTAL Class 1 Class 2 ! TOTAL
58A 5 79 84 720 720
65A 9 164 173 130 130
15N/S 4 54 58 8 8
SUBTOTAL 18 297 858
TOTAL 315 858
% ERROR: 172%
The bid price for bridge 58A was $75,424 based on the estimated
quantities. The final price was $176,748 or an increase of $101,324.
Like the other bridges, some of the work items for this bridge had minor
quantity variations, however the entire increase in price can be
attributed to the increase in the quantities of Class 2 concrete removal.
In this case, like the previous cases, inadequate component
inspection caused the owner to have to issue a change order to add the
required quantities of work to the contract. A portion of the $101K in
added cost is attributed to the work itself and the owner would have paid
a portion of this amount even if the quantities of work had been correctly
described. However, some of this increase in price is attributed to the
penalty costs that the owner paid because the quantity of the concrete
removal was incorrectly described in the contract documents.
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4.5 Fairchild Air Force Base, State of Washington
Fairchild Air Force Base is located 12 miles east of Spokane,
Washington, in the east central part of the state. The base provides a
Military Airlift Command and Strategic Air Command air base for the U.S.
Air Force.
4.5.1 Scope of project
A contract was awarded in the spring of 1983 in the amount $1,396K to
perform a variety of items of repair work to the runway. There were nine
items on the bid schedule. Five of the nine items were priced on lump-sum
basis and four were priced on a unit price basis. Three of the unit price
items consisted of the removal and repair of spalled concrete each to a
different depth. The fourth unit price item was to rout and seal random
POC cracks.
4.5.2 The problem
As the work progressed it became evident that the actual quantities
of three out of the four unit price items would vary significantly from
the estimated quantities. The estimated quantities of work were based on
a survey of approximately 10% of the areas to be worked using redding and
visual inspection. The actual quantities were determined as the project
progressed through the work area. A schedule showing the quantities of
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work (estimated and actual) and bid unit prices and the total amount for
each work item is shown below:
ITEM EST ACT % UNIT BID FINAL
QUANT QUANT ERROR PRICE AMOUNT AMOUNT
1. 3"-9" SPALL 29,000 45,135 56% $12.74 $369K $575K
REPAIR (SF)
2. >9" SPALL 20,000 13,835 -31% $19.60 $392K $271K
REPAIR (SF)
3. SEAL PQC 25,000 6,600 -73% $1.10 $27. 5K $7.26K
CRACKS (LF)
BID COST $789K
FINAL COST (AT BID UNIT PRICE) $853K
The owner issued changes to the contractor to add the additional
quantity of work for item 1 to the contract and did not grant a time
extension to the contractor, so in effect the owner was accelerating the
work. As shown on the schedule above the owner agreed to pay the
contractor at the bid price for the additional quantities of work. The
total cost of the three items of work in which there were significant
quantity variances increased $64K from $789K to $853K. The owner also had
to pay a premium of $80K, in addition to the above, to cover the costs
associated with accelerating the work and requiring that the added
quantities of item 1 be completed without a time extension [3].
A portion of this increased cost of $144K ($64K + $80K) could have
been avoided if the correct quantities of work had been known at the time
the contract was bid. Although the cost of the project would have
increased some extent just to cover the additional required quantities of




If the estimated quantities of work had been correct the contractor
would have bid a lower unit price for the work because the fixed overhead
costs could have been spread over a greater quantity of work. So by
continuing to pay the contractor the originally bid price for the work the
owner was overpaying the contractor's overhead costs. Although the owner
agreed to this price, the fundamental principle remains that as the number
of unit increase the cost per unit drops. Ihis benefit of lower prices
due to greater quantities is much easier to obtain in the bid box than at
the negotiation table. Especially when the parties are under the time
constraints of an ongoing project.
The $80K paid to the contractor to accelerate the work could also
have been avoided if the quantity of work had been estimated to within the
contract variance threshold of 15%. The contractor did not know of the
additional quantities of work when he planned the job, or even in the
early stages of the project, so he planned an efficient, level effort
throughout the term of the contract in order to maximize his profit.
Instead, because of the extra work, he had to rush in an inefficient
manner during the latter period of the contract in order to complete the
added work on time. This inefficient operation was the cause of the
additional $80K the owner had to pay.
4.6 Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota
Minot Air Force Base is a Strategic Air Command base in North Dakota




The airfield was constructed in the late 1950 's and no major repair
have been undertaken since construction. Minor repairs to spalled areas
have been done with concrete and asphalt by in-house forces over the
years.
4.6.1 Scope of project
A unit price contract to perform various repairs to the airfield
pavement repairs was awarded on 22 April 1986 in the amount of $1,539K.
The scope of the work included 18 various work items, however in this
analysis we will only be concerned with the following two items of work
that made up the greatest portion of the contract:
Item 1 Sealing of cracks in POC pavement
Item 2 FCC pavement patches
The contractor was allowed 215 calendar days to complete the work
(from 1 April 1986 to 1 November 1986). The period after 1 November was
designated as a winter exclusion period in which work was not permitted
due to the weather. The pavements to be worked on in this contract were
divided into areas and requirements were established for the contractor as
to the sequence in which these areas would be worked and how many areas
could be in progress at any one time. The contractor had to complete the
area he was working before he could go on. Additionally two areas could
be worked on only during certain weekends when aircraft were not flying.




After the contract was awarded, during the course of the work, the
actual amount of POC patching (spall repair) required became much greater
than the estimated quantity and the quantity of POC crack repair required
was much less than estimated. The owner issued change orders to the
contractor throughout the course of the project to cover the additional
work. Eventually the amount of the added work became so great that the
contractor could not finish before the winter exclusion period. At this
point the contractor demobilized for the winter and returned in the next
construction season to complete the work [4].
The estimated quantities were determined through a visual inspection
of a small portion of the project area. The actual quantities were
determined as the work progressed and the contractor moved from one work
area to the next in the sequence as discussed above. The following
schedule shows the estimated and actual quantities for these work items:
ITEM EST ACT % UNIT









124,000 50,842 -59% $1.25/LF





The final contract price was $2,458K. The increase of $919K can be
primarily attributed to the 335% increase in the quantity of POC spall
repair required as shown above.
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A portion of the $919K increase in the price of the contract was
inevitable given the significant increases in the quantity of work for PCC
spall repair. However, if the estimated quantity of work had been
correctly described in the contact documents a portion of these additional
costs could have been avoided.
The owner paid the bid unit prices for the additional work since the
contractor was entitled to some compensation associated with adding the
work after award and his demobilization and remobilization in the spring.
In this case the owner thought it was best to use the bid unit price
rather than take the time to audit and review the contractor's new unit
cost and take the likely risk that the cost could even be higher than the
bid price.
At first glance one might conclude that none of the increase was a
penalty cost since the contractor did not raise his unit price. However,
the real issue is how much would the contractor's bid price have been if
the owner had known the quantity of work to within the contract variance
threshold allowed by the contract. The bid prices would have been
different if the amount of work had been known.
In general, the unit price for the FCC crack repair would have been
more and the unit price for the PCC spall repair would have been less. Of
course, this is only a general relationship, and in this case a lower
price for the PCC spall repair may have been offset by the additional
costs of remobilizing in the spring to finish the work. However, if the
owner had known of the large quantity of work that was required steps
would have been taken to niinimize the impact. The owner would not have
issued a contract package knowing that the contractor would not finish in
one season or would cause the contract to drag out into the next year.
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Examples of the steps that could have been taken include, dividing the
work into two contracts, telling the contractor at the outset what his
rate of production must be or structuring the contract requirements so
that a contractor can realistically finish in a season. In any event, the
owner cannot make such decisions if the required quantity of the work is
not known.
User related penalty costs could also have been avoided if the
quantity of work had been correctly estimated. Because the work extended
onto the next year there were additional interferences to the operational
users of the airfield. Aircraft had to be relocated to allow the work to
progress. Security arrangements had to be made for another season.
Operational personnel wasted their time doing over again what should have
only needed to be done once the previous year. The result is that the
facilities organization lost some credibility because they are still
impacting the user with a project that should have already been complete.
4.7 Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine
Naval Air Station Brunswick is located near Brunswick, Maine in the
southern coastal section of the state. The mission of the air station is
to support six squadrons of P-3 Orion anti-submarine patrol aircraft.
The airfield has two parallel runways 7000 feet long and 200 feet
wide. The outboard runway is not instrument equipped and is only useful
in good weather. The inboard runway is equipped for instrument landings
and is the only runway plowed in the winter, thus making it the most
active and operationally critical runway. This discussion is concerned
with the instrument capable inboard runway.
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This runway was constructed in 1951. It was last repaired in 1971 by
replacing sections and recycling the existing asphalt.
4.7.2 Scope of project
On 30 September 1986 a lump-sum contract was awarded for
approximately $3 ,963k to perform repairs of the instrument runway and -
other electrical work. The pavement repair portion of the contract was
approximately $1 ,400k. The contractor was allowed 435 days to complete
the work and the contract completion date was 9 December 1987. It was
imperative that the work be completed as quickly as possible during the
summer months, not only for construction reasons, but more importantly the
non-instrument equipped runway would have to be used for operations during
the construction. Therefore, while the project was ongoing if bad weather
set in any aircraft landings would have to be diverted to other airfields
over one hundred miles away.
The scope of work called for the crack sealing of approximately
100,000 LF of cracks in the asphalt pavement and the placement of an
asphalt overlay. A reinforcing fabric was called for between the new and
the old pavement for the center 100 feet.
4.7.3 The problem
When the paving work began in April of 1987 the amount of pavement
distress had increased considerably and the designed repair, as required
by the contract documents, was no longer appropriate for this increased
amount of distressed pavement. The designed repair was based on a visual
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inspection of the runway conducted in April 1985 that showed that
estimated the amount of distressed pavement at 9,000 SF. When the amount
of distressed pavement was discovered to be greater than estimated, the
same firm that did the original survey was requested to resurvey. This
survey showed that the amount of distressed pavement had increased to
120,000 SF. The designed repair, if executed, would have resulted in
excessive reflective cracking within several years. The large amount of
distressed pavement would not have provided an adequate base for the
overlay, even with the fabric.
At this point a redesign of the intended repair method was required
and the contract for the repair of the runway had to be changed to
accommodate this new method of repair.
The new design called for the full-width reconstruction of the the
first 200 LF at each end of the runway and the center 66 feet for the
remainder of the runway. The reconstruction was to be done by removing
the pavement, recompacting the existing base course and replacement with a
binder course. The remainder of the pavement was to be repaired by
milling off at least 2 1/2" and replacing with a leveling course. Then a
wearing course was to be installed over the entire runway surface [5].
This change added approximately $593K to the cost of the construction
contract. The penalty costs in this case are a portion of these change
order costs associated with the fact that the original repair contract was
awarded to do the incorrect repair and as a result the contract had to be
changed and the additional costs were incurred.
A portion of the cost of this change can be attributed to the cost of
deferring the repair work two years. This is the additional cost the
owner would have expected to pay for waiting two years to do the work if
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the redesigned repair had been included in the contract documents . This
cost is estimated to be $424K.
However, the remainder of the change cost, $169K ($593K - $424K), is
the penalty cost of awarding a repair contract in which the method of
repair had to be changed because the actual condition of the facility was
different from that which formed a basis for the design in the contract.
Not that the component inspection performed in 1985 itself was in error,
just that the condition of the runway continued to deteriorate and the
component inspection methods employed by the owner failed to take this
into account. This resulted in the need for a contract change.
The penalty costs were caused primarily by the need to complete the
work in the original time of the contract. This caused the contractor to
have to bring all of his firm's production capacity to bear of this one
project. His crews had to work 7 days a week thus lowering their
productivity. The fact that the cost of this change was negotiated as the
work was ongoing also contributed to this penalty cost portion. In short,
purchasing this additional repair effort under after contract award
instead of in the bid box accounted for this increase of $169K. This
penalty cost does not include the additional internal costs the owner
incurred for administering the contract changes.
4.8 Summary
These cases show examples in which errors in component inspection
resulted in changes to a facility repair contract. These changes in turn
caused the owner to incur additional costs, or penalty costs, that could
have been avoided had the nature of the repair work been correctly
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described in the contract documents. And as previously discussed, the
role of component inspection is to adequately describe the nature of the
work in the contract documents
The next chapter will examine the source of these changes due to
inadequate component inspection and the nature of the penalty costs that
result. The purpose will be to understand the composition and source of
penalty costs and to examine how they can be calculated or estimated.
This understanding of penalty costs will be used in Chapter Seven to
calculate the penalty costs for each of the above cases. These penalty
costs will be plotted against the degree of error in component inspection
that occurred in each case. This will show a relationship between the
penalty cost as a function of the degree of error. The actual cost of the
component inspection information for that project will be calculated and
shown on the same plot. The cost of alternate component inspection
methods and their associated degree of error will also be plotted. The
total cost curve, similar to the one shown in Chapter Two, will be used to
determine if alternate component inspection methods would have lowered the
total cost to the project.
CHAPTER POUR ENDNOTES:
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CONTRACT CHANGES AND PENALTY COSTS RESULTING FRCM
INADEQUATE COMPONENT INSPECTION
This chapter will discuss the contract change orders that occur in
the execution of repair work by contract due to inadequate component
inspection and further describe the penalty costs associated with these
changes as introduced in Chapter Two. This chapter will describe the
contract change orders costs, the different types of penalty costs and how
these costs behave and their cost components.
5 . 1 Introduction
Contract change orders are defined as a change or a modification to
the legal agreement between the owner and the contractor. Different
owners use a variety of terms to describe a contract change. They are
known as bilateral or supplemental agreements, modifications to the
contact, construction contract changes, unilateral modifications and
simply "change orders". The exact name is unimportant. The important
issue is that these changes represent a situation where the originally
contracted work must be changed for one reason or another. The original
contract must be either added to or deleted from to accommodate different
requirements. These contract changes can occur for a host of reasons.
This thesis is concerned with contract changes that occur because of
inadequate component inspection. If the change was caused because the
nature of the work was described incorrectly to such a degree that a
change is required to correct the error, it is a change this thesis is
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interested in. A great portion of the changes that occur on facility
repair contracts are related to incorrectly describing the nature of the
repair work [1]. The vast majority of these changes could be prevented if
the nature of the work had been correctly described in the contract
documents. Many times this could be done through the use more component
inspection or the selection of different component inspection methods.
5.2 Penalty costs associated with changes
This section will further define and discuss the concept of penalty
costs which were introduced in Chapter Two. In Chapter Two penalty costs
were defined as the additional cost of performing the repair work as a
result of changes caused by inadequate component inspection. An important
point to remember when quantifying and discussing these costs is that a
penalty cost is defined as the cost of doing the work less what the same
work would have otherwise cost if the nature of the work had been
correctly described in the contract documents.
Conceptually, when determining the penalty costs the entire cost of
the change must be separated into two parts: 1) the costs that would have
otherwise been incurred if the nature of the work had been correctly
described in the contract documents at the outset, and 2) the portion that
was paid over that amount because the nature of the work was described
incorrectly, and a change was needed to get the work done. The second
part is the additional expense above and beyond the work itself associated
with adding work or deleting work from a contract after award. These are




The total cost of a change is comprised of costs from the following
three categories: agency costs , user costs and political costs. Penalty
costs are contained in these categories. Each of these categories can be
separated into a portion that the owner would have paid had there been
adequate component inspection and the penalty cost portion associated with
inadequate component inspection.
Agency costs are the largest and easiest to quantify of the three
categories of change costs. The penalty portion of agency costs are the
additional costs that must be borne directly by the owner as a result of
the change. Agency costs can be further divided into other sub-categories
and these are shown in Figure 5.1. User costs are borne by the user of
the facility and are associated with the time required to complete a
repair project. The penalty portion is associated with the additional
time required to complete the project when the contract is changed after
award. Political costs are the costs related to the loss of credibility
the facilities management organization suffers as a result of having to
change the contract, and subject the user to delays and the owner to
additional costs. Although intangible, these are real costs.
These next sections will discuss these categories of change costs in
more detail, discuss the nature of these costs and identify the penalty
cost portion of each category. The penalty cost portion of each category
depends on the circumstances surrounding the change.
In Chapter Seven this thesis continues the analysis of the cases in
Chapter Four. In this analysis some penalty costs such as direct penalty
costs are evident in the analysis of the case examples. Examples of these
are overtime labor costs and material costs. Other penalty costs, such as
those associated with the labor learning curve, internal administration
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costs or the overhead costs, are not evident and in order to account for
these in an analysis they must be calculated. The calculation of these
penalty costs must be based on knowledge about the way in which these
costs behave in respect to the project costs and change costs. The
following sections will provide this information so that in Chapter Seven
the penalty costs can be examined based on the discussion of this
chapter.
For each of these penalty costs it will be assumed that they
increase linearly with the increase in the degree of error in the
component inspection information. Since the degree of error is related to
the added quantities of work this is a reasonable relationship to assume.
Although it may not be exactly linear this is a good approximation for the
purposes of this thesis.
5.3 Agency costs
Agency costs are a category of the change costs that must be
absorbed by the owner's facilities management organization. As shown in
Figure 5.1 there are three types agency costs:
1) contract funds - funds paid to the contractor.
2) redesign costs - additional design and component inspection costs
as a result of the change.
3) internal contract administration costs - internal cost of
administering the contract change.
The contract funds are the largest type of agency costs that contribute to
the penalty costs and they occur in most changes caused by inadequate
component inspection. Redesign costs only occur when the change to the
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contract requires a redesign. Internal administration costs occur as a
penalty cost in all changes due to the cost of administering the change.
They are entirely penalty costs since if there was no change these costs
would not occur.
The next sections will discuss each of these costs in more detail,
show how they increase as a result of a change and show how the penalty
cost portion can be identified.
5.3.1 Contract funds
The contract funds are the funds paid to the contractor to
compensate him for the cost of changing the contract. Once a contract has
been awarded to perform a certain specified scope of repair work this
represents a legal agreement between the owner and the contractor in which
they have both relied. If the terms of the contract are changed then the
price of the contract must be adjusted to equitably compensate the parties
for the change. These costs paid to change the contract can be divided
into three categories as shown in Figure 5.1: 1) direct costs, 2) overhead
costs, and 3) impact costs [2],
Direct costs can be traced and tracked directly to the work. Three
types of direct costs will be considered in this thesis: labor, material
and equipment costs.
Overhead costs are the costs associated with the work, but not
directly traceable to any certain portion of the work. Overhead costs are
either job overhead or home office overhead depending on where they
occur. Job overhead can be further divided into fixed and variable
overhead costs. Job overhead costs are estimated to be 15% of the cost of
78

a project, of which 10% is estimated to be variable and 5% is estimated to
be fixed [3]. Examples of variable overhead costs are supervision,
insurance and bonds. Examples of fixed overhead costs are job site
trailer rental, utilities and superintendent salary. Variable overhead
costs change directly with the amount of work that is added or deleted
from the contract. Fixed overhead costs tend to increase with the
duration of the project, however they may still be reasonably estimated as
a percent of the quantity or cost of the work.
Home office overhead costs are generally all fixed overhead costs.
"Ihese are the costs to the contractor of being in business and are
generally unavoidable. Examples of these are salaries of office
employees, home office rent and utilities and general business expenses.
The total cost of the home office overhead can range from 3 to 10% of the
cost of the project and 5% will be used as a reasonable estimate of the
home office overhead [ 3 ]
.
In section 5.3.1.2 and in Chapter Seven, 10% will be used as an
estimate of variable overhead costs and 10% (5% from job overhead and 5%
from home office overhead) will be used as an estimate of fixed overhead
costs.
Impact costs are the additional compensation due the contractor
because of the impact the changed work has on the originally contracted
(unchanged) work [4].
Although the cost of a change order may include all of the above
cost categories, the entire amount of each category is not always
considered to contribute towards the penalty cost. Now that each of these
cost has been defined, the thesis will discuss each one in the context of
how they can be separated into the portion that contributes to the penalty
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costs and the portion the owner would have paid anyway if the repair work
had been correctly described in the contract documents.
5.3.1.1 Direct penalty costs.
As stated earlier direct costs are composed of labor, material and
equipment directly charged to the project. The cost to change a contract
is composed of these costs, but only a portion of these costs are penalty
costs. For example, in the Middlesex bridge case additional concrete
removal was added to the project. The owner would have paid some amount
for the direct costs of that added work even if the estimated quantities
of work had been correct. The question of penalty cost involves what
additional costs did the owner incur by adding the work after the contract
was awarded.
Material costs
The penalty cost portion of material costs can be effected by
changing the amount of work in the contract. If work is added and the
contractor obtained a volume discount for the materials required to
accomplish the originally contracted amount of work the increase may mean
that he is unable to again receive this discount. In this case the price
would be higher than if the work had been included in the contract
documents and this increase would be a penalty cost. If the duration of
the project is extended, where it otherwise would not have been, any
escalation in material prices would cause material prices to increase.
This would be a penalty cost since this escalation could have been avoided
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of the contract had not been extended to accommodate the change. On the
other hand, if work is deleted or the repair method is changed and the
contractor has pre-purchased materials that are no longer needed in the
project, the cost of those materials or the freight to return them would
be a penalty cost.
Labor costs
Tabor costs to perform the changed work are affected by the amount
of work that is added or deleted and whether or not a time extension is
granted in connection with the added work.
If work is added to the contract and the owner does not grant a time
extension and the contractor is required to perform the work on a shift
work basis or by the use of overtime this would cause the contractor's
labor cost to increase above what the work would have cost on a straight
time basis. The entire amount of this increase would be considered a
penalty cost.
On the other hand, if a time extension is granted there will be
enough time to allow the contractor to complete the work at a normal
schedule. This usually means that the contractor can finish the work
without resorting to shift work or overtime work and other work methods
that would constitute acceleration on the part of the owner. If the
contractor is given adequate time to finish the job at a normal production
schedule then the penalty portion of the labor costs would be zero.
The exception to this would be if the extension ran the work into
bad weather or the end of the construction season which could have been
avoided by the owner. In this case the additional labor costs of
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performing the work in the bad weather would be penalty costs and the cost
of escalation in labor rates that may occur during the length of any work
stoppages would be labor penalty costs. People work less efficiently in
the more adverse weather. The work is still possible to accomplish, but
it requires more labor per unit. A good example of this is the Middlesex
bridge case where freeze protection had to be provided to cold weather
concrete work.
The other labor penalty cost associated with adding work is the lost
benefit the owner would receive from the learning curve. If the
contractor had known that there were more quantities than estimated his
labor per unit would have been lower to reflect the fact that his crews
get more efficient as more quantities of the same work are done. However,
when the owner adds work after award it is very difficult to get the
contractor to pass this increased efficiency onto the owner in the
negotiations. The penalty cost can be calculated using learning curve
theory.
For example, a reasonable estimate of the slope of a learning curve
for construction is 90% [5]. This means that every time the quantity of
work doubles the time it takes to complete the additional units of work
decreases by 10%. For example, if a contractor had bid $10/unit for the
work and 40% or $4 is labor cost then the total labor cost for an
estimated quantity of 1000 units would be $4000 based on his projected
productivity. If the quantity was increased to 4000 units, the learning
curve theory says the labor for the second 1000 units would be 10% less or
a savings of $0.40 per unit on the second 1000 units. The labor cost is
now $3.60/unit. When the quantity was again doubled from 2000 to 4000 the
average labor cost would again go down by 10% to $3.24/unit. This would
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generate a savings of $0.76 per unit ($4.00 - $3.24) over the bid labor
cost of $4.00/unit or a total savings of $1520 ($0.76 x 2000) for units
2000 through 4000. If these additional quantities had been known at bid
time the contractor would have reflected these savings in his bid.
However, since they are added after award the owner will not realize these
savings at the negotiation table [4].
The penalty costs associated with the learning curve theory can be
estimated by assuming a reasonable slope for the learning curve and that a
certain percent of the unit price is labor costs. For the purposes of the
analysis presented in Chapter Seven a 90% learning curve will be assumed
and labor costs will be 48% of the unit price. Although the learning
curve can be applied to any size change in quantities, in this thesis, due
to the approximations that are made, it will only be applied where
quantities have changed by several fold.
This learning curve argument also effects labor costs when
quantities are deleted from the contract. The contractor may argue that
he was relying on the benefits of the learning curve to obtain lower labor
costs. So because he will not do as many quantities his average labor
cost per unit will be higher.
Equipment costs
The penalty portion of equipment costs are effected by the
production capability of the equipment, the cost of short-term versus
long-term rental periods and the fixed equipment costs such as delivery
and set up expenses [3]. If the optimum amount of equipment is brought to
the job and less work is required then the cost of the extra equipment
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that is idled on the job becomes a penalty cost since it was not needed.
If more equipment is required, then the additional cost of bringing it to
the project on short notice is a penalty cost.
In the case where work was added to the contract, whether or not the
additional equipment costs are considered penalty costs depends on whether
a time extension was granted with the change. If a time extension was
granted and the contractor was allowed to complete the work with the
equipment he already had on site there would be no penalty costs.
However, if a time extension is not granted and he was required to rent
additional equipment the penalty cost would be the portion of the cost of
the equipment associated with the shorter rental periods, the cost of
rushing it to the job site, and the fixed set up and delivery charges.
These costs would not have been incurred if the contractor had known the
amount of the work prior to bidding the job. He would not have had to
rush the equipment to the job and the sizes of the equipment initially
selected may have even been different so that fewer pieces would have been
needed. If the time extension runs the work into the winter season and
the work must stop, then there are other equipment penalty costs
associated with the cost of this equipment over the period of the work
stoppage and the re-mobilization costs.
In the case where work was deleted from the contract, equipment
costs would be most likely to increase since there would be shorter rental
periods and the fixed portion of these costs such as delivery charges
would be spread over less units of work. These costs would be penalty
costs since the contractor would be geared up to perform the estimated
quantity of work and not until he was well into the job would it become
evident that the estimated quantities would not be achieved. The extra
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equipment would have to be returned early. If the quantity of work had
been described correctly he would not have ordered so many pieces of
equipment. These costs increase as less units of work are performed.
5.3.1.2 Overhead penalty costs
Variable overhead
Variable overhead costs increase as work is added to the contract,
either through the addition of more quantities or a change in the repair
method. These additional variable overhead costs are not considered to be
penalty costs since they are independent of the fact that the work was
added after contract award due to inadequate component inspection. These
variable overhead costs would have to be paid by the owner even if the
work had been included in the contract at the outset.
Fixed overhead
Whether or not fixed overhead costs that are considered to be a
penalty cost is dependent on the time extensions that are granted by the




If the time extension could have been avoided had the nature of the
work had been correctly described, then the fixed overhead costs on the
changed work are penalty costs since they were caused by inadequate
component inspection. However, if the time extension would have been
required regardless of the change, then the fixed overhead costs would
have been paid by the owner in any event and they are not penalty costs.
If a time extension is not granted in conjunction with the change
then fixed overhead costs are not considered penalty costs, unless the
contractor continues to be paid the bid unit price which includes fixed
overhead. In this case the contractor is being over compensated for his
fixed overhead costs. These are overabsorbed overhead costs and they are
a penalty cost. If the added quantities of work had been known this
additional compensation for fixed overhead would not have been included in
his bid. Therefore, this overabsorbed fixed overhead is a penalty cost of
inadequate component inspection.
An example of this is the Fairchild Air Force Base case in which the
contractor was paid the bid price for the additional quantities of work
and thus was over compensated for his fixed overhead costs. The fixed
overhead costs on that job were paid when the estimated quantity of work
was completed. The price for any quantities done after this point should
have decreased by the amount of the fixed overhead costs in the bid
price.
When work is deleted from the contract each remaining unit must
absorb a greater portion of the fixed overhead costs. These are
underabsorbed overhead costs and they are penalty costs. Although, one
might argue that these fixed overhead are not penalty costs since the
agency would have paid for them in the bid had the nature of the work been
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correctly described. Realistically, however these costs would not be
included in the contractor's bid if they made his mark-up so high as to
make him noncompetitive. The contractor may have not bid the job if his
overhead cost structure made him noncompetitive on smaller projects.
Additionally, in deleting work any overhead costs that may have already
been expended are penalty costs since they are not recoverable.
For the purposes of calculating the overhead penalty costs the
percentages discussed in section 5.3.1 will be used. The variable
overhead costs are estimated to be 10% of the cost of the work and the
fixed overhead costs will be 10% of the cost of the work. These are
reasonable estimates and can be used to calculate penalty costs in the
case analysis in Chapter Seven.
5.3.1.3 Impact costs
Impact costs are the additional compensation due the contractor
because of the impact the changed work has had on the originally
contracted work. Impact costs are entirely penalty costs since they occur
as a result of the change and if the changed work had been included in the
contract documents at the outset there would be no change and no impact
costs [2].
Impact costs are not applicable to situations where work is deleted
from the contract, but they are relevant to situations where more of the
same type of work is added or a new method of work is added by the
change. The existence of impact costs in connection with a change is
dependent on the individual circumstances of the project. The magnitude
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of the impact costs will depend on how the new work interferes with the
originally contracted work. The magnitude of the impact costs would tend
to increase with increasing magnitude of the changed work both in quantity
and effort required. The greater the amount of changed work added to the
contract the greater the impact costs will be. Impact costs could be
minimized if the owner granted a time extension unless the extension has
pushed the unchanged work out into a period where the adverse weather
caused the costs to increase. This also would be an impact cost related
to the quantity of work added.
5.3.1.4 Negotiated penalty costs
In general, negotiated prices for the same work are higher than
competitively bid prices [6]. Therefore, if the owner determines the
price of the added work through negotiation rather than using a price
determined through competitive bidding the price for the added work will
be higher. This same rational holds true for work that is deleted from
the contract after award. The credit obtained is not as great as it would
have been if it had been bid with the change reflected in the contract
documents [2]. The cost of work that is priced without competition,
either additive or deductive, is less beneficial to the owner than if
competition had been used.
This difference between negotiated costs and bid costs contributes
to the penalty costs associated with changes to the contract. Penalty
costs in this category are the premium price associated with purchasing
repair work at negotiated prices versus competitively bid prices.
Negotiated penalty costs only occur when the price of the added or deleted
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work is determined through negotiation. If the price of the changed work
is determined losing a price that was based on competitive bidding then
there is no penalty cost. Additionally, if the negotiated costs are
already included as another type of penalty costs then they are not
counted again as negotiated penalty costs.
Competitively bid contracts for repair are awarded on the basis of
the lowest possible price. However, the price for negotiated contract or
negotiated changes to contracts are awarded on the basis of a price that
is fair and reasonable. These prices are higher than the lowest possible
price [ 7 ] . This difference also exists because the price for work added
or deleted after award is based on its estimated value at that time of the
change, whereas the value of that same work if it had been purchased at
the time of award would have been based on its value at the time of
bidding. So when the owner either purchases (additive) or sells
(deductive) work after award of the contract the price at this time is
usually different than the price would have been if bid [7].
If this penalty cost is applicable to the situation it can be
estimated as a percent of the cost of the change. This amount could
easily be 5 to 10 percent. For the purposes of the analysis in Chapter
Seven the magnitude of the negotiated penalty costs will be estimated as
7%. In some of the cases to be analyzed in Chapter Seven it will be
evident what the negotiated penalty costs are, however in some cases it
may be necessary to calculate this penalty cost. If so 7% will be used.
Additionally, in situations where a negotiated price cannot be
agreed on or there is not time to negotiate a price for the added work,
owners may have the contractor work on a "force account" or unilateral
change basis. In regard to calculating negotiated penalty costs this
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situation is the same as if the price had been negotiated. This
arrangement tends to drive up prices since the contractor realizes he will
be reimbursed for all costs and the incentive to economize and run a
productive operation is lost.
5.3.2 Redesign costs
Redesign costs are the agency costs associated with designing a new
repair method to be used in the change that is different from the one
called for in the contract documents. Redesign costs only occur where
there is a change in the repair method associated with the change. In
this situation the contract documents described the nature of the work
incorrectly to such a degree that the method of work called for in the
contract documents was no longer appropriate and a new repair method must
be designed. The cost of the redesign, which may include some additional
component inspection costs, are the redesign costs. The entire portion of
redesign costs are considered a penalty cost. If there had not been a
change due to inadequate component inspection, then there would not have
been any redesign costs.
If the change simply adds more quantities of work to the contract
and the repair method remains the same as called for in the contract
documents then redesign costs do not occur and therefore, no penalty costs
for this category. Redesign costs increase with the quantity and cost of
work added to the contract. There magnitude can be expressed as a percent
of the cost of the added work.
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5.3.3 Internal contract administration costs
Internal contract administration costs are the cost to the agency of
administering the change to the contract. The administration of changes
always involves additional time spent by the owner's contract managers.
Larger changes require the detailed audit and review of costs and pricing
data to justify the negotiated prices. This is a very time consuming
process that is a cost of changing the contract. For example, in the
Middlesex bridge case the resident engineer spent 2-3 weeks reviewing the
contractor's cost data to determine the new price for changed work. Many
times these changes result in claims and legal proceeding the consume vast
amounts of internal agency resources. Managing these changes is a major
problem in the administration of facility repair contracts [1].
Although this cost is more of an opportunity cost than a true
out-of-pocket expense to the agency, if the contract managers were not
working on the change they could be spending their time on some more
worthwhile tasks. And eventually, if there were not as many changes to
administer, the number of agency personnel required would decease and the
cost of administering facility repair contracts as a whole would decrease.
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command charges a fee of 5.5% of
the cost of a project including changes to cover their contract
administration costs which are known as supervision, inspection and
overhead. Ihe Vermont Agency of Transportation uses a fee between 5% and
15% of the contract price depending on the individual job. Other public
agencies use percentages that are in the same order of magnitude.
Managing the changes that occur in the course of these contract consumes
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a large portion of the contract management effort. Although some contract
management effort would be required if the changed work was added to the
contract prior to award, it would not be near as great as when work is
added by change order after award. In effect, this is the additional
effort required internal to the agency to add or delete work after
contract award. The cost of this additional effort is a penalty cost.
From the author's experience this additional effort can consume a-
third of the total effort of administering a contract for facility repair
work. From this a reasonable estimate of the cost of administering these
changes is one third of the administration fee charged by these public
owners to administer contracts. For the analysis in Chapter Seven this
penalty cost will be 2% of the contract funds associated with the change.
This is approximately one third of the fee these agencies charge and is a
reasonable method to estimate this penalty cost.
5.4 User costs
User costs represent the costs of increased delays and inconvenience
of not being able to use the facility under repair during the duration of
the repair project. One example of this is delays to vehicles while a
bridge has restricted capacity during lane closures for repair work. User
costs in airfield pavement work are represented by delays to aircraft and
reduced airfield capacity. In military airfields increased user costs
show up as reduced mission capacity, increased security requirements,




The penalty portion of user costs are associated with the additional
delay to the completion of the project or an extension of the project
duration due to a contract change. This means user will be without the
full use of the facility for an additional period of time thus increasing
the user costs associated with the project from the amount estimated at
the start of the project.
User penalty costs are sensitive to project time extensions. If
there is no time extension, then there are no user penalty costs. If the
length of the project is extended then it must be determined whether the
extension was unavoidable or avoidable. If the extension was unavoidable
then there are no penalty user costs because the user is not without the
facility any longer than they would have been otherwise. However, if the
time extension was avoidable then these additional user costs are penalty
costs. There are also user penalty costs if the contract is extended over
the winter season and the inconvenience that results from restarting the
contract the next season. A good example of this was the Minot Air Force
Base case where the contractor returned the following year to finish the
work and the flight operations had to be again rescheduled, aircraft had
to be relocated and additional security provided. If the quantity of work
had been described correctly and the work was completed in the first year
these additional user costs have been avoided.
Because of the nature of these user penalty costs they are difficult
to quantify. Although sensitive to time extensions and the length of the
avoidable time extension, their magnitude is a function of the individual
facility. For this reason they are discussed here, but will not be




One of the main objectives of the owner's facility management
organization is to insure that the facilities are kept at the highest
levels of serviceability. When this goal is not achieved, because an
existing contract must be changed due to inadequate component inspection,
there is some amount of embarrassment that this organization suffers.
This is a political cost and can be very damaging to the facilities
management organization and the moral of its members.
Whenever the cost to complete a project or the time to complete a
project increases, regardless of whether it is any greater than it would
have cost without the change, ultimately this results in lowering the
confidence the public has in the organizations appointed to manage their
public facilities [8].
Political costs are like user costs in that they are difficult to
quantify. They are also real in that they represent the loss of
confidence the public has in the organizations that manage their public
facilities and the lost moral of the people who work for these facilities
management organizations [9]. Facilities management is very much a public
relations business and when schedules slip and deadlines are not met there
is a loss of confidence in the organization. Despite the fact that only a
portion of the increased project costs would have occurred if the work was
correctly described, taxpayers begin to wonder how efficiently their funds
are being spent by these organizations when the duration and cost of
projects are greater than was planned. Additionally, no one is proud to
work for an organization that is constantly under criticism for not being
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able to live up to its ooinmitments in terms of the time and the cost of
completing projects.
5.6 Summary
This chapter has described each type of penalty cost and the sources
of those costs. The agency costs can be quantified, however user and
political user costs are quite variable and will not be quantified in
later analysis. Figure 5.2 shows the types of penalty costs and the
sources of these costs.
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NEGOTIATED Difference between competitively bid and negotiated
prices for the same work. Only applicable where cost of
changed work is determined by negotiation.
REDESIGN COSTS Cost to design new method of
repair
None
INTERNAL COST Cost to administer work on a change order basis rather
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COMPONENT DEFECT ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
This Chapter will discuss and explain the component defect analysis
(CDA^ fraiiework"as~a~tcol to" examine Ifte^ with
inadequate component inspection and contract changes in facility repair
projects. However, before discussing the framework itself the next
section will discuss the three attributes that describe defects in
facility components.
6.1 Attributes of component defects
Character, severity and extent are the three attributes that are used
to describe a component defect and the nature of the repair work. The
goal of component inspection is to obtain information about these three
attributes for inclusion in the contract documents. These three
attributes must be described in the contract documents in some level of
detail or degree of accuracy in order for the contract documents to be
considered complete.
6.1.1 Character
The character of a defect describes what type of defect it is. For
example, a defect could be a spall, a crack, delamination, etc.
Generally, the designer of the repair project will prescribe a repair
method based on the character of the defect. The contractor will base his
bid on this repair method as prescribed in the contract documents. If the
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character of the defect is incorrectly determined, penalty costs will
occur due to the retirement to add a new repair method or to redesign a
different repair method.
6.1.2 Severity
Ihe severity attribute describes the degree to which the defect has
progressed in the component. Severity is measured in relative terms.
There are no specific units to measure severity. For example the severity
of alligator cracking may be described as low, medium or high [1].
Severity describes the condition or state of progression of that
particular defect at a given location in the component.
Like character, information about the severity of a defect is
important in selecting the repair method. However, the attribute of
severity is not relevant to repair methods in which the deteriorated
portion of the component is completely removed and new materials are put
in their place. This is opposed to repair methods where the deteriorated
sections are left in place.
For example, severity is not relevant to spalls and joint repair since
the method of repair involves removing deteriorated sections and putting
new materials in their place. In these cases the repair method is
unaffected by the severity of the defect because all of the deteriorated
material is removed. On the other hand, severity is important to crack
filling and overlays since the new material will come in contact with the
deteriorated portions of the component. In the component defect analysis
diagram severity is considered as a separate attribute, but it should be
remembered that it is only relevant to certain methods of repair. If
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severity is not relevant then the parts of the diagram that pertain to
severity simply drop out.
6.1.3 Extent
The attribute of extent describes the quantity of the defect that is
present in the facility component. This attribute could be expressed in
area and/or depth or simply volume. It primarily effects the quantities
of work to be done by the contractor. However, if a large error is made
in the extent of a defect this could cause the repair method called out in
the contract documents to be inappropriate in that the method selected
would not be the most efficient considering the actual extent of the
defect.
6.2 Component defect analysis diagram
The purpose of the component defect analysis framework is to provide a
logical method to examine errors made in component inspection and the
resulting penalty costs caused by these errors. The component defect
analysis diagram is a representation of this framework. The diagram
begins with component inspection and shows the possible errors that could
be made in describing the attributes of component defects and the penalty
costs that result from these errors. The diagram is broken down into two
levels. Level 1 shows the logical progression of possible errors that
could occur when describing the attributes of a component defect. The
possible errors lead to level 2 of the diagram where the corrective
actions of the owner's facilities management organization are described.
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These are the actions the owners take to rectify the errors that have
occurred in the component inspection process. These corrective actions,
usually a change to the contract, result in penalty costs. Each of these
combinations of possible errors, corrective actions and associated penalty
costs are designated error scenarios. The next sections will describe the
component defect analysis diagram shown as Figure 6.1.
6.2.1 Component Defect Analysis Diagram Level 1 - Attribute errors
Level 1 of the component defect analysis diagram illustrates the
possible errors that could occur in describing the attributes of component
defects. The defect attributes are considered in the component defect
analysis diagram in the order they were discussed in the previous section.
Character is the most important attribute since it has the greatest
effect in determining the repair method. Severity is the second most
important attribute since its purpose is almost the same. However, it is
only important for certain methods of repair in which the old work
remains. Extent is considered third since it only becomes important when
the preceding attributes have been correctly described. Its primary
importance is in describing the quantity of work and this is important
only if the method of repair has been correctly determined.
On the left side of the diagram, the two possible ways for character
to be incorrectly described is either 1) not identified on the contract
documents, or 2) misidentified as another type of defect. Severity and
extent are not considered after this point since errors in these
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If character is described correctly then severity is considered, if it
is relevant to the method of repair. Severity can be incorrectly
described as either overstated or understated. In either case extent is
not considered after this point because it has no effect on penalty
costs. The amount of work (extent) the contractor must perform is
unimportant if the method of work must be changed because the severity or
character of the defect was incorrectly described.
Overstated and understated are defined to mean that the severity of
the defect was in error to such a degree as to cause the designer to
select a method of repair that is different from that which would have
been selected had the actual severity been known. If the method of repair
must be changed due to the difference between the estimated and the actual
severity then the severity was incorrectly described. Even though the
component inspection method may have caused an error in describing the
severity of a defect it is not considered inadequate component inspection
unless this error causes it to be necessary to change the method of
repair.
If character and severity have been correctly described then the
extent can be either incorrect or correct. If it is correct then the work
is executed as planned as shown in the diagram. This is the goal of
component inspection and occurs when component inspection is adequate.
Ihe extent of a defect can be incorrectly described by either
overestimating or underestimating the quantity of work. Extent is
correctly described if the contract variance threshold has not been
exceeded. If the threshold is based on the contract price, as in the case
of the State of Vermont, it will be assumed that it applies to the
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quantities of work since they are closely related. This is a reasonable
assumption that will facilitate the analysis in Chapter Seven.
In summary, the three attributes can be described either correctly or
incorrectly. This combined with the two possible ways to incorrectly
describe each attribute (e.g. over/underestimate, etc.) yields seven
possible combinations. Six combinations in which an error in attribute
description is identified are designated error scenarios A through F. The
seventh combination results when the three attributes are all correctly
identified.
6.2.2 Level 2 - Cwner's corrective actions
Level 2 of the diagram shows the corrective actions that are taken by
the owner to correct the errors made in describing the attributes of the
defects for each of the six error scenarios A - F. These actions are
taken by the owner after contract award when the error in attribute
description is discovered. These actions are the change orders that are
caused by inadequate component inspection.
In developing these corrective actions only the actions of a prudent
owner have been considered. For each of the corrective actions shown in
level 2 there exists an opposite action that is sometimes feasible, but
always impractical. These imprudent actions are not considered in this
diagram because they are actions that a prudent and cost conscience owner
would not make.
A good example of this is when the character attribute has been
incorrectly described as not identified on the contract documents. As
shown on the component defect analysis diagram, the prudent owner makes
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the corrective decision to do the required work. However, the opposite
imprudent action would be for the owner to decide not to do the required
work. This would result in essentially ignoring the defect and leaving
the problem uncorrected possibly until a future repair project. Ihis is
not the decision a prudent owner would make. A decision of this nature
increases the life cycle cost of a facility and lowers the performance of
the facility after the project is complete. This is not to say that this
type of decision is not possible, or is not made under circumstances such
as funding constraints. However, the component defect analysis diagram
will not consider these imprudent owner actions.
In summary, this section has discussed the three attributes used to
describe component defects, the possible errors that could result from
incorrectly describing those attributes and the actions a prudent owner
would take to correct the errors made by inadequate component inspection.
This leads to the penalty costs that result from each of these corrective
actions. The next section will discuss and develop equations for the
penalty costs that occur in error scenarios A - F.
6.3 Penalty costs for error scenarios A though F
This section will discuss the penalty costs that are associated with
error scenarios A - F. Each scenario has some or all the types of penalty
costs discussed in Chapter Five associated with it. The circumstances
surrounding each scenario will determine which penalty costs apply.
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In the discussion of each error scenario the following outline will be
used: 1) a review of the events that lead up to the error, 2) the action
(contract change) required to correct the error and the associated penalty
costs and, 3) the equation of penalty costs for each scenario.
In this discussion the following general equation of penalty costs
will be tailored to form a penalty costs equation for each scenario:
PC = DC + OH+IM + NC + RE + ICA
The terms of the equation are defined as follows:
PC = Penalty costs
DC = Direct penalty costs
OH = Overhead penalty costs
IM = Impact costs
NC = Negotiated penalty costs
RE = Redesign penalty costs
ICA = Internal contract administration penalty costs.
Each of these penalty cost terms can be expressed as a function of the
amount work added or deleted from the contract by using the
proportionality factors Al through A6 as shown below:
DC = Al x Q
OH = A2 x Q
IM = A3 x Q
NC = A4 x Q
RE = A5 x Q
ICA = A6 x Q
Therefore, the general penalty cost equation can be written as;
PC=(A1 + A2+A3+A4+A5+A6) XQ
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Where the amount of changed work is represented by the variable Q. In the
scenarios where both deleted and added work are considered, Ql will denote
added work and Q2 will denote deleted work as follows:
Ql = amount of added work and PCI = penalty cost of added work
Q2 = amount of deleted work and PC2 = penalty cost of deleted work
In the case of lump-sum contracts (primarily error scenarios A through
D) the variable Q represents the entire amount of changed work. In the
case of unit price contracts (primarily error scenarios E and F) it
represents the amount of changed work outside of the contract variance
threshold. For the purposes of this thesis it will be assumed that the
factors Al through A6 have the same value when applied to added work (Ql)
as when applied to deleted work (Q2).
In Chapter Five the value of some of the proportionality factors were
determined for use in the case analysis in Chapter Seven. Namely:
A2 = 10% used to calculate fixed overhead penalty cost (OH)
.
A4 = 7% used to calculate negotiated penalty cost (NC)
.
A6 = 2% used to calculate internal contract administration cost (ICA).
These known factors are important in cases where the value of a particular
penalty cost term is not evident from the data, for example in the case of
internal contract administration costs. However, where the value of the
term can be determined from the data available the proportionality factor
is not needed in the analysis.
User penalty costs and political costs are not quantified in this
general penalty cost equation. For this reason they will be discussed
here as a whole as opposed to individually in each scenario. As described
in Chapter Five, whether user penalty costs occur or not is dependent on
the time extension that is granted. The magnitude of the user penalty
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cost is dependent on the characteristics of the individual facility.
These costs will not be included in the penalty costs equations of each
scenario due to their individual nature as discussed in Chapter Five.
Political costs were discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Since it is
difficult to attach a dollar value to these costs, they are not included
in the equations of penalty costs for each error scenario.
6.3.1 Error scenario A - Incorrect character/ defect not identified
In this error scenario the component defect was not noted on the
contract documents. The defect was discovered after award of the contract
to repair other defects in the facility. This scenario requires that a
method of repair be designed based on the newly discovered defect. The
contract is modified to add the requirement for this new repair method.
If the extent of the new defect is known a lump-sum price may be agreed
on; if the extent is unknown then a unit price may be negotiated. In
either case the cost of the new work is a negotiated price established
without the benefit of competition.
Penalty costs
In this scenario the total contract price will increase to reflect
work that was not included in the contract. There would be no penalty
cost portion of direct costs unless a time extension was not granted. If
a time extension was not granted the labor costs and the equipment costs
would expected to include penalty costs. These would be a percentage of
the added work and they would increase with the amount of the new work.
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The overhead penalty costs would depend on whether a time extension
was granted as discussed in Chapter Five. If there was an avoidable tiine
extension these fixed overhead costs would be a penalty cost. These fixed
overhead costs would also increase linearly since they are a percent of
the cost of the added work.
Design costs for the added work would not be a penalty cost since no
repair method for this defect was designed with the original design
effort. Therefore, this design is a cost that would have been incurred
even if the defect had been known.
Penalty cost equations
The following equations describe the penalty costs for this scenario
for each of the following circumstances regarding a time extension:
No time extension: PC=DC+IM+NC+ ICA (1)
= (Al + A3 + A4 + A6) x Q
Unavoidable time extension: PC = IM + NC + ICA (2)
= (A3 + A4 + A6) X Q
Avoidable time extension: PC = OH + IM + NC + ICA (3)
= (A2 + A3 + A4 + A6) x Q
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6.3.2 Error scenario B - Incorrect character - defect misidentified
In this scenario a certain defect and method of repair have been
described in the contract documents. However, after contract award it is
discovered that the actual defect is different from the type described in
the contract documents and as a result the method of repair is no longer
appropriate. The corrective action in this scenario is to repair the
defect actually discovered. In order to accomplish this the method of
repair specified must be deleted from the contract and a new method of
repair added. This involves a deductive and an additive change order to
the contract.
Penalty costs
In general the penalty costs in this scenario involve the penalty
costs for the deleting the specified repair method, plus the penalty cost
associated with adding a new repair method.
The penalty cost for the deleted work include the cost of any work,
direct or overhead, that has already been expended in the pursuit of the
deleted repair method and is no longer useful to the project. This could
include pre-purchased materials or the fixed costs associated equipment
already delivered to the site.
The negotiated penalty cost also applies to the value of the deleted
work if the price was determined through negotiated prices. This is a
penalty cost of changing the work.
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Redesign costs in this scenario would be penalty costs since the
repair method for this defect should have been designed with the original
design. Redesign costs are a percent of the contract funds for the change
and would increase linearly with the added work.
Penalty cost equations
From the above discussion the equation for the penalty costs in this
scenario must include the penalty cost for the deleted work (PCI) and the
penalty costs for the added work (PC2). This is expressed as:
PC = PCI + PC2
Where: PC2 = DC + OH + NC + ICA (4)
= (Al + A2 + A4 + A6) X Q2
Note that PC2 is calculated using the amount of the deleted work Q2.
PCI can be calculated using the general equation for penalty costs.
The equations for these penalty costs would vary depending on whether a
time extension was granted as did scenario A. The following equations
describe the penalty costs for the added work (PCI) in this scenario for
each of the following circumstances regarding a time extension:
No time extension: PCI = DC + IM + NC + RE+ ICA (5)
= (Al + A3 + A4 + A5 + A6) x Ql
Unavoidable time extension: PCI = IM + NC + RE + ICA (6)
= (A3 + A4 + A5 + A6) x Ql
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Avoidable time extension: PCI = OH + IM + NC + RE + ICA (7)
= (A2 + A3 + A4 + A5 + A6) X Ql
6.3.3 Error scenario C - Correct character/ incorrect severity -
overstated
In this scenario the contract documents have correctly described the
character of the defect, however the severity has been incorrectly
described by being overstated. After contract award the severity of the
defect is correctly determined to be less than that described in the
contract documents. The result of this error scenario is that the repair
method selected is inappropriate. The repair method specified was based
on the belief that the defect was worse than it actually is. The
corrective action is to design an appropriate method of repair and
substitute it for the contracted method of repair.
Penalty costs
In this scenario the specified method of repair must be deleted from
the contract and a new method of repair designed and added to the
contract. This involves a deductive change and an additive change to the
contract. In this regard this scenario is very similar to error scenario
B.
In general, the total cost of the contract in this scenario will
decrease since the severity was overstated the new method of work will
presumably be designed to address a lesser degree of severity, and this
will require less effort and cost. In this scenario there is not likely
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to be a time extension since the total effort required of the contractor
is less than originally contracted for.
The penalty costs for the deleted work (PC2) and the added work (PCI)
would include the same elements as discussed in scenario B.
Penalty cost equations
The penalty cost equation for this scenario must include the penalty
cost for the deleted work and the penalty costs for the added work. This
is expressed as:
PC = PC2 + PCI
Where: PC2 = DC + OH + NC + ICA (8)
= (Al + A2 + A4 + A6) X Q2
PCI can be calculated using the general equation for penalty costs.
The following equation describes the penalty cost for the added work in
this scenario with various time extensions:
No time extension: PCI = DC + IM + NC + RE + ICA (9)
= (Al + A3 + A4 + A5 + A6) x Ql
Unavoidable time extension: PCI = IM + NC + RE + ICA (10)
= (A3 + A4 + A5 + A6) x Ql
Avoidable time extension: PCI = 0H + IM + NC + RE + ICA (11)
= (A2 + A3 + A4 + A5 + A6) x Ql
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6.3.4 Error scenario D - Correct character/ incorrect severity -
understated
In this scenario the contract documents have correctly described the
character of the defect, however the severity has been incorrectly
described by being understated. After contract award the severity of the
defect is discovered to be greater than described in the contract
documents. The method of repair specified was based on the severity being
less than it actually is and would be inadequate if performed as
specified.
In this scenario the corrective action is much like scenario B and C.
The specified repair must be deleted from the contract and the new method
of repair added to the contract. The significant difference in this case
is the total price of the contract is likely to increase due to the
greater level of effort required because of the greater than anticipated
severity of the defect.
Penalty costs
Again in this scenario the penalty costs can be discussed in terms of
a cost to delete the specified repair method and the cost to add a new
repair method. The penalty costs associated with deleting work will




The penalty cost equation for this scenario must include the penalty
cost for the deleted work and the penalty costs for the added work. This
is expressed as:
PC = PC2 + PCI
Where: PC2 = DC + OH + NC + ICA (12)
= (Al + A2 + A4 + A6) X Q2
PCI can be calculated using the general equation for penalty costs.
The following equation describes the penalty cost for the added work in
this scenario with various time extensions:
No time extension: PCI =DC+IM+NC+RE+ ICA (13)
= (Al + A3 + A4 + A5 + A6) X Ql
Unavoidable tijme extension: PCI = IM + NC + RE + ICA (14)
= (A3 + A4 + A5 + A6) X Ql
Avoidable time extension: PCI = QH + IM + NC + RE + ICA (15)
= (A2 + A3 + A4 + A5 + A6) X Ql
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6.3.5 Error scenario E - Character correct/ severity correct/ extent
incorrect - overestimated
In this scenario the character and severity (if relevant) of the
defect were described correctly on the contract documents. However, the
extent of the defect was overestimated. The actual quantity of work is
less than the estimated quantity of work. In this scenario the owner
directs the contractor to perform only the work that is required and
estimated quantities of work are decreased to the required amount by a
contract change.
Penalty costs
Direct penalty costs would occur in this scenario. They would occur
if the contractor lost a quantity material discount due to the change or
the contractor already has pre-purchased materials. This penalty cost
will increase linearly with decreasing quantities of work.
Labor penalty costs could be expected for higher unit costs based on
the lack of the benefit of the learning curve. The contractor could claim
that he was relying on doing a greater number of units, and thus his crews
would become more efficient and his overall per unit labor costs would
decrease.
Equipment penalty costs would occur in this scenario due to shorter
rental periods. The fixed equipment costs such as delivery charges would
be spread over less units of work. These penalty costs would increase as
less and less units of work are performed.
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The overhead penalty costs would occur in this scenario due to a
portion of the fixed overhead costs.
Redesign penalty costs would not occur in this scenario.
Penalty cost equations
The penalty cost equation for this scenario is the penalty cost for.
the deleted quantities of work. In this scenario:
PC = PC2
Where: PC2=DC+0H+NC+ ICA (16)
= (Al + A2 + A4 + A6) x Q2
In this scenario there would not be a time extension since the total
effort required of the contractor is less than originally contracted for.
6.3.6 Error scenario F: Character correct/ severity correct/ extent
incorrect - underestimated
In this scenario the character and severity of the defect were
described correctly in the contract documents. However, the extent was
underestimated. The actual quantity of work required is greater than the
estimated quantity. The owner decides to perform the required quantities
of work and the estimated quantities are increased to the actually needed
amount. In this scenario a time extension is normally justified because
of the addition of work to the contract. Therefore, if the owner chooses
not to grant one this would require the contractor to accelerate the work
and the owner could expect to pay the associated acceleration costs which




The amount of penalty costs associated with a change in this scenario
are most sensitive to whether or not the owner grants a time extension in
conjunction with the change. Generally in this scenario the owner must
decide to either: 1) require the contractor to complete the additional
work by the original completion date and pay the added labor costs
(overtime, shift work) and impact costs, or 2) grant the contractor a
schedule extension and pay the additional overhead costs. If he allows a
schedule extension this may put the completion date into the less
desirable season of the year for construction work and the work may become
more costly as a result. Alternatively, a time extension may extend the
project into a period of the year when construction is not feasible and
the contractor must demobilize and return in the next construction
season. This issue was discussed in Chapter Five with regard to the
effect time extensions had on the penalty costs associated with a change.
This decision the owner must make can be described as several
options. These various options determine the penalty cost equation that
applies to each scenario. Each of the options of this error scenario will
be designated 1-3. First the three options will be described.
The first option the owner has is to require the added work to be
completed in the original contract time with no time extension. Assuming
that more time was justified, which is a reasonable assumption in this




The second option is to grant a time extension and the length of the
extension does not run the completion date into adverse weather so that
the cost of the work increases or the work must be stopped. If the length
of the time extension in this option is the same as it would have been had
the quantity of work been known then the penalty costs are irdnimal
(unavoidable time extension). If however, the length of the time
extension could have been reduced or completely eliminate had the quantity
of the work been known then the penalty costs will increase since this
time extension could have been avoided (avoidable time extension).
The third option is that the time extension is granted and the length
of the extension runs the project into adverse weather and either: 1) the
work had to be stopped and started again in the next season; or 2) the
work continued in the adverse weather and experienced delays and lower
productivity. Either of these would cause the cost of the work to
increase. If the quantity of work had been known by the owner the
additional cost caused by this adverse weather situation could have been
avoided. In this option the costs of encountering this adverse weather
situation are penalty costs.
OPTION 1: In this option there is no time extension, therefore the
contractor must accelerate the work to complete in the original time
period. Direct penalty costs would occur because of the acceleration of
the work.
The fixed overhead costs would not increase, and therefore these are
penalty costs if they are paid to the contractor.
Option 1 penalty costs equation
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No time extension: PC = DC + OH + IM + NC + ICA (17)
= (Al + A2 + A3 + A4 + A6) X Q
OPTION 2: In this option work is added to the contract and the schedule
is extended so that the work continues without encountering adverse
weather that could impede progress or cause the work to stop. If the
length of the time extension granted by the owner is the same as it would
have been had the guantity of work been correctly known, then the penalty
cost would be due to negotiated instead of competitively bid costs and
internal contract administration.
On the other hand, if the time extension could have been avoided if
the guantity of the work had been correctly known at bid time then there
are other penalty costs.
Direct penalty costs and overhead penalty costs would occur. Impact
costs would not occur since the schedule has been extended and thus the
effect on the other work has been reduced.
Option 2 penalty cost equation
Unavoidable time extension: PC = NC + ICA (18)
= (A4 + A6) x Q
Avoidable time extension: PC = DC + OH + NC + ICA (19)
= (Al + A2 + A4 + A6) X Q
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OPTION 3: In this option, like Option 2, the owner adds additional
quantities of work to the contract and grants a schedule extension.
However , in this case the length of the schedule extension is such that
the completion date runs into adverse weather that increases the costs of
the work over what it would have been, or causes the work to stop and
restart the next season. This involves demobilization and remobilization
in the next season. In this option the time extension is avoidable since
if the quantity of work had been known the owner would not have contracted
the work such that this adverse weather problem was encountered.
Penalty overhead costs would occur. Variable overhead costs would
increase because of the additional quantities of work, but would not be
penalty costs. Fixed overhead costs would be a penalty cost since the
time extension was avoidable.
Impact costs in this option would be likely to occur and would be
penalty costs.
Option 3 penalty cost equation
Avoidable time extension: PC = DC + OH + IM + NC + ICA (20)
= (Al + A2 + A3 + A4 + A6) X Q
6.4 Summary
This chapter has identified the six different error scenarios that can
occur in component inspection and developed equations for the penalty
costs that result from these errors. In the next chapter each of the
cases discussed in Chapter Four will be classified as to the error
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scenario that occurred and the penalty costs will be determined using the
appropriate penalty cost equation.
CHAPTER SIX ENDNOTES:
[1] "Condition Survey Procedures for Navy and Marine Corps Airfield
Pavements", prepared by U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station,





ANALYSIS OF PENALTY COSTS AND COMPONENT INSPECTION COSTS
This chapter will reexamine the cases presented in Chapter Four.
From a conceptual perspective the goal will be to develop a plot similar
to the one shown in Figure 2.1 for each case. The penalty cost and the
component inspection cost will be expressed as a function of the percent
error in the component inspection information.
The understanding of penalty costs developed in Chapter Five and the
equations in Chapter Six will be used to calculate the penalty costs for
each of the cases. These penalty costs will be plotted against the
percent error that occurred in each case. This will show a relationship
between the penalty cost as a function of the percent error.
The cost of the component inspection method actually used for a
project will be shown on the same plot. The cost of alternate component
inspection methods will be estimated along with the degree of error an
owner might expect to obtain from that particular method. These costs and
their associated percent error will also be plotted. This data will
produce a total cost curve, similar to the one shown in Figure 2.1.
Analysis of this total cost curve for each project will enable the thesis
to draw conclusions as to the effect alternate, more costly component
inspection methods have on the total cost of the project.
The component inspection cost used in this analysis will be the cost
of the method itself, not including any costs associated with the speed of
the method or how long the user is without the facility while the
component inspection is being conducted. Although the speed of a method
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is a decision criteria for selecting a component inspection method as
discussed in section 2.4.3, this criteria will not be quantified in this
analysis. The importance of this factor varies for each individual
facility and it is difficult to quantify. None the less, it is a factor
that owners should remember when selecting a component inspection method.
Although one component inspection method may result in a lower total cost
than another method, if the time to perform the component inspection is so
great that it is unacceptable to the user the first method should not be
selected.
Additionally, by presenting, discussing and analyzing the details of
these cases this thesis will show that the component defect analysis
diagram shown in Chapter Six, with error scenarios (A-F) and the penalty
cost equations ( 1-20 ) , is adequate as a tool for looking at the penalty
costs associated with errors in component inspection.
7 . 1 Introduction
This chapter will discuss each case using the following format:
1. Give an overview of the case from Chapter Four. Classify the case
according to the error scenarios presented in Chapter Six and show the
penalty cost equation that applies.
2. Describe and calculate the penalty costs that occurred.
3. Draw a plot of the penalty costs versus the degree of error in the
component inspection information. Discuss whether the penalty costs are
those that were predicted in the penalty cost equation.
4. Describe the component inspection method actually used and estimate
its cost. Show this as the initial component inspection cost point.
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5. Calculate data points corresponding to alternate component inspection
methods that could have been used. Estimate costs of these alternative
methods and the accuracy they would yield.
6. Plot the total cost curve.
7. From this analysis draw conclusions as to the appropriateness of the
component inspection method actually used in the case and the benefits in
terms of lower total cost that could be achieved by spending more on
component inspection and employing alternate methods. This conclusion
could support a more costly investigation using the existing component
inspection methods, newer non-contact methods or maintaining the method
actually used.
7.2 State of Vermont - Middlesex Bridge
The scope of this project was the repair of the deteriorated sections
of concrete bridge decks on three bridges in Vermont. The extent of the
deterioration was underestimated in the contract documents. The
contractor was granted a time extension to complete this additional work.
However, the time extension ran the work into the winter weather. This
time extension could have been avoided if the quantity of work had been
known at the outset.
This case is an example of error scenario F - option 3 as discussed
in Chapter Six. The penalty cost equation that applies to this scenario





The original amount of the contract was $250K. This increased to $374K















MIDDLESEX 20 345 365 319 600 818 124%
PLAINFIELD 3 46 49 20 53 73 49%
WAITSFTELD 1 7 8 61 20 81 912%
SUBTOTAL 24 398 400 673
TOTAL CLASS 1 AND 2 422 1072
TOTAL PERCENT ERROR 154%
Both classes of removal involve removing deteriorated concrete,
preparing the exposed surface and placing new concrete. Class 1 removal
was down to the top mat of reinforcement and class 2 was down to at least
3/4" below the top mat of reinforcement.
As a result of the increase in the quantity of work the contractor
was entitled to request additional compensation in the adjustment to the
unit prices. He requested an increase in the unit price for class 1 and 2
concrete removal due to the fact that the additional quantities pushed the
work into the winter and the work was more expensive. His crews worked
less efficiently, he had to work overtime and the concrete work now
required freeze protection thus, driving his unit costs higher than if the
work had been completed in the less adverse weather.
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He also requested additional equipment costs for rental of more
traffic control devices. He was planning to work the bridges
consecutively, however, with the additional quantities of work they had to
be worked concurrently. This additional rental cost would not have been
incurred if not for adding the additional quantities after contract award
during the course of the contract. Because the contractor had to work the
bridges concurrently, due to the additional quantities, he now needed two
sets of control devices vice the one set he had planned on if work had
gone according to his schedule.
Review of the contractor's request and his detailed cost records by
state engineers showed that the justified cost increase for concrete work
was $7.30/SY or a total of $7822 (1072 SY x $7.30/SY) in labor penalty
costs. As for the traffic control devices the state established that the
contractor would have been 31 days late on the contract considering his
actual production rate if the quantity of work had been unchanged. So
because of contractor's low production rate the extra devices were needed
in spite of additional work. However, to complete extra work required 90
days beyond the contract completion date.
Therefore, because of the joint responsibility for the cost of
additional traffic devices, the penalty cost is the cost of the added
traffic devices less the 31 days that the contractor would have been late
in any event or $8640 in equipment penalty costs.
The owner also lost the benefit of the learning curve associated
with the additional quantities. Assuming a 90% slope of the learning
curve and 48% of the unit price ($100/SY) is labor this is a penalty cost
of $3121 as calculated below:
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1 422 422 $48
(48% X $100)
423 844 422 $43.20
(90% X $48)
$4.80 $2096
845 1072 228 $43.20 $4.80 $1095
Total saving due to learning curve that is penalty cost: $3121
* Assume no further reduction in labor costs associated with increase in
quantities since quantity of work added would have to increase to 1688
(844 x 2) to obtain another 10% reduction.
The above penalty costs for labor, equipment, and the learning curve
represent direct penalty costs (DC) in the penalty cost equation.
There were no penalty costs associated with variable overhead since
this cost would have been paid if the quantities had been correct.
However, the fixed overhead paid on the additional quantities of work is
a penalty cost. If the quantity of the work had been known at the outset
the time extension could have been avoided and the additional fixed
overhead would not have been paid. Fixed overhead penalty costs are
calculated using proportionality factor A2 and the relationship from
Chapter Six as shown below:
A2 x Q = OH
10% x (1072SY - 1.25 x 422SY) x $100/SY = $5,445
The internal administration costs of reviewing the contractor's cost
records and the cost of administering the change to the contract are
penalty costs. These are calculated as 2% of the increase in the
contract funds using the proportionality factor A6 as shown below:
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A6 X Q = ICA
2% X (1072SY - 1.25 X 422SY) X $100/SY = $1,230
There were no negotiated penalty costs in this case since the price
of the added work was determined using the bid prices. Impact costs also
did not occur as predicted by the penalty cost equation. In this case
three out of the five penalty cost terms in the penalty costs equation
occurred and they are summarized as follows:
Direct penalty costs - DC $19,583
Labor $7,822
Equipment $8 , 640
Learning curve $3,121
Fixed overhead - OH $5,445
Internal contract admin cost - ICA $1,230
Total penalty costs - PC $26,258 or say $26K
A penalty cost of $26K and the percent error in describing the
extent of the defect of 154% is used to plot the penalty cost curve shown
as Figure 7.1. The penalty costs are zero at the contract variance
threshold. The penalty costs increase to $26K for the 154% error. The
behavior of the penalty costs between these two points are assumed to be
linear in nature. This is a reasonable assumption given the cost
elements involved and the fact that penalty costs increase with the
increase in the degree of error.
7.2.2 Actual component inspection method and cost
For this project Vermont used its standard bridge inspection
procedures to estimate quantities of work. This includes a complete
visual inspection of the bridge and half-cell potential readings on a 5
foot grid. A reasonable estimate of the cost of these tests would be
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COST VS. PERCENT ERROR
VERMONT - MIDDLESEX BRIDGE
PENALTY TOTAL























PENALTY COST = $26K AT 154% ERROR




ACTUAL METHOD 1 154%
ACTT TAT, AND HALF-CELL hn 2 4.5 125%
2" GRID
ACTUAL AND IR 3 5.6 100%
ACTUAL, IR AND GPR 4 6.4 50%





$1,000 per bridge [1]. Using this actual component inspection method,
the state was able to achieve a percent error of 154% at a cost of $3,000
for the three bridges in this contract.
7.2.3 Alternate component inspection methods and costs
In this section the cost of alternate component inspection methods
and their expected degree of error will be examined.
Vermont could have reduced the grid size for their half-cell tests
to 2 feet from 5 feet. The remainder of the survey procedure would have
remained the same. This would have increased the cost of the entire
method to an estimated $4,500 and increased the accuracy of this method
to an estimated 125% percent error.
Vermont could have selected infrared thermography (IR) as an
alternate method to use in conjunction with their standard method. The
area of the three bridge decks is 26,000 SF and IR is estimated to cost
$0.10 per SF on bridge decks. The total cost of this method would be
$5,600 ($3,000 + $2,600). A reasonable estimate of the percent error for
this method is 100%.
Vermont could also have selected a component inspection method that
would use both ground penetrating radar (GPR) and IR together. A cost of
$0.13 per SF will be used as reasonable for this combination of sensors.
With this method the data processing costs would be almost the same, but
there would be a longer data collection time for the GFR since the path
width of the sensor is less. The cost for this method, combined with the
standard method, would be $6,380. The percent error using this method
would improve over the previous method to an estimated 50%.
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As a final method the state could have used IR and GPR in
conjunction with selective demolition of portions of the deck and
extensive coring to confirm the results of the IR and GPR data. This
would have added $10,000 to the cost of the previous method, for a total
of $16,380. The demolition would have cost an estimated $5,000 and the
taking of a large number of core samples another $5,000. The degree of
accuracy obtained with this method could be estimated as 25%.
The costs and the percent error for each of these alternate
component inspection methods are shown and plotted on Figure 7.1.
7.2.4 Total costs
Review of the total cost curve shows that the optimum component
inspection method was the actual survey method combined with IR and GPR.
The additional $3.4K (for a total of $6.4K) spent on component inspection
to reduce the percent error would have been worth the investment. This
would have lowered total cost to $11. 8K versus the $29K that was spent on
the standard component inspection method and the associated penalty
costs. Even if the percent error for the optimum method had been greater
than the 50% estimated, up to as high as 125%, the total cost would still
have been lower using this method rather than the standard method alone.
Looking further at the trend of the total cost curve below 50% error
their is no further benefit to be gained by spending more on component
inspection. The total cost curve begins to increase at this point. In
this case it was beneficial for the owner to spend more on component




7.3 Veteran's Memorial Bridge - Portland, Maine
This project was a unit price contract to perform repairs to the
Veteran's Memorial bridge in Portland, Maine. The project included work
items to repair the deteriorated sections of the concrete bridge deck.
After the work started it became evident that the amount of removal
required would far exceed the estimated quantity. For this reason the
owner directed the contractor to change from spot removal above and below
the reinforcement to complete removal of concrete above the reinforcement
with a milling machine and spot removal below the reinforcement by hand
where required. In this case the owner changed the removal method in an
effort to minimize the penalty costs associated with requiring the
contractor to complete the tremendous increase in quantities of work on
an accelerated basis without a time extension.
This case is an example of error scenario F - option 1. From
Chapter Six the penalty cost equation that applies to this case is
equation number 17 as shown below:
PC=DC+QH+IM+NC+ ICA (17)
7.3.1 Penalty costs
If the work had continued as it was intended the owner would have
added $548K to the price of the contract. However, with the change in
removal method the cost of the added work was reduced to $515K. This
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included $479K for the cost of milling the deck and placing the concrete
overlay and $36K for the added quantities of removal that were paid at
the bid price.
The estimated quantities and actual quantities paid at the bid price
are shown below:
REMOVAL ESTIMATED BID ESTIMATED ACTUAL ACTUAL
TYPE QUANT PRICE PRICE QUANT PRICE
1 3,600 SF $8/SF $28,800 5,400 SF $43,200
2 2,400 SF $18/SF $43,200 3,600 SF $64,800
TOTAL 6,000 SF $72,000 9,000 SF $108,000
The $479K cost included payment for 8038 SF of additional type 2
removal in the areas of the deck where it was required after milling.
This added amount of type 2 removal is shown below combined with the
amount of removal paid at the bid price:
REMOVAL ESTIMATED
QUANT
ACTUAL QUANTITY (SF} PERCENT
TYPE AT BID IN MTTLTNG TOTAL ERROR
SF PRICE COST
1 3,600 5,400 5,400 50%
2 2,400 3,600 8,038 11,638 384%
TOTAL 6,000 9,000 8,038 17,038 184%
The above table shows that the percent error in the estimated
quantities of work for this contract was 184%. In this analysis type 1
and 2 removal will be considered together as the same defect since the




The added amount of removal, both at the bid price and as a part of
the milling cost, include the type 1 and 2 removal that was encountered
before the change and all the type 2 removal in the milled areas.
Although the milling procedure is actually type 1 removal over the entire
deck, the quantity of type 1 removal shown in the milling cost column is
zero because this analysis is concerned with estimating the extent of a
defect that is actually in the bridge deck. In this case it is impossible
to determine how much type 1 defect was actually present in the milled
areas since type 1 was done over the entire deck. Milling of the top 1"
of the deck removed a lot of good concrete and it would be unfair to
include this amount in the measure of the error.
Maine Department of Transportation contracts do not state a definite
contract variance threshold. The contract allows the state to increase or
decrease the quantities of work at the bid price unless this substantially
changes the character of the work. For the purposes of this analysis a
contract variance threshold of 25% will be used as reasonable. In order
for a change to be substantial the magnitude of the change must lie
between 10% and 50% [2]. This assumption will facilitate calculating the
penalty costs and drawing the penalty cost curve for this case.
The direct penalty costs (DC) in this case are generated by the
learning curve efficiencies gained by the contractor because of the excess
quantities of type 2 removal. This amount is $22. IK as calculated below.
Type 1 removal is not considered in this learning curve penalty cost
analysis since the quantities did not increase by several fold and the
work was switched from being labor intensive to equipment intensive. When
the type 1 removal is done by milling machine the equipment costs are 63%
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of the cost. Any learning curve benefit for this work item was
insignificant. If the removal method had not been changed the direct
penalty costs associated with the learning curve would have been greater.
CALCULATION OF DIRECT PENALTY COSTS DUE TO LEARNING CURVE
UNITS AVERAGE LABOR SAVINGS
FROM TO QUANT COSTS PER UNIT PER UNIT TOTAL
2400 2400 $8.64
(48% X $18.00)
2401 4800 2400 $7.78
(90% x $8.64)
$0.86 $2064
4801 9600 4800 $7.00
(90% x $7.78)
$1.64 $7872
9601 11,638 2038 $7.00 $1.64
Total saving due to learning curve that is penalty cost:
$3342
$13,278
* Assume no further reduction in labor costs due to additional quantities.
The penalty overhead costs (OH) are the overabsorbed fixed overhead
costs on the amount of added work greater than the contract variance
threshold. This is calculated using the proportionality factor A2 as
follows:
A2 x Q = OH
10% X [$108K - (1.25 X $72K)] = $1.8K
These penalty costs also would have been much greater if the removal
method had not be changed.
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The negotiated penalty costs (NC) incurred in this case are
associated with the fact that the price for the milling was determined
based on negotiations. The amount of this penalty cost is calculated
using the proportionality factor A4 as follows:
A4 x Q = NC
7% X $479K = $33. 5K
The internal contract administration penalty cost are calculated
using A6 as 2% of the amount of added work as follows:
A6 x Q = ICA
2% X [$515K - (1.25 X $72K)] = $8.5K
Although the penalty cost equation included the impact cost term
(IM), it did not occur in this case. However, four out of the five terms
did occur. These four penalty cost terms are summarized below:
Direct penalty cost - DC $13. 3K
Overhead penalty cost - OH $1.8K
Negotiated penalty cost - NC $33.5K
Internal contract administration - ICA $8.5K
Total penalty costs - PC $57. IK
If the owner had continued with the spot removal method the
magnitude of the change and the magnitude of the penalty costs would have
been much more. However, by telling the contractor to do the work a
different way a great portion of the penalty costs were avoided. In any
event, the work still cost more than it would have if the required
quantity of work had been correctly called out in the contract
documents. The above penalty costs represent this additional amount.
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7.3.2 Actual component inspection method and cost
Maine DOT uses a standard bridge inspection procedure to determine
the estimated quantities of work for a bridge deck repair project. These
inspection procedures include a visual inspection of the top and bottom
of the deck and coring for chloride content and testing for compressive
strength [3] [4]. The cost for these test procedures is approximately
$3,000 per bridge and requires approximately 10 man days of effort [5].
The percent accuracy obtained was 184%.
7.3.3 Alternate component inspection methods and costs
The owner could have chosen infrared thermography (IR) as an
alternate component inspection method. The cost of this method would
have been $0.10 per SF. The area to be surveyed was 108,000 SF. The
total cost would have been $13,800 when combined with the standard
procedure. This method is reported to have very good accuracy, however
for this analysis 100% will be used as an estimate.
The owner could also have selected a combination of infrared
thermography and ground penetrating radar (GPR) as an alternate method.
The cost of this method would have been $17,040 based on a cost of $0.13
per SF. The percent error generated by this method could be assumed to
be 50%.
The owner could have chosen to combine IR and GFR with some of the
existing methods for component inspection. Extensive core sampling,
half-cell potential tests and selective demolition could have been added
to confirm the results of the IR and the GFR. The addition of these
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methods would have increased the component inspection cost by $13K to a
total of $30,040. Ihe half-cell tests are estimated to costs $3,000.
The combination of these method would have provided an estimated accuracy
of 25%.
These alternate component inspection methods are plotted with the
penalty cost curve on Figure 7.2.
7.3.4 Total costs
Review of the total cost curve shows that if the owner had selected
some of the alternative component inspection methods penalty costs would
have been lower and the total cost to the project would have decreased.
The optimum component inspection method was the actual method combined
with IR and GPR. The total cost was lowered from $60. IK to $26K by
investing $14K in a more accurate component inspection method at the
beginning of the project. The use of more accurate component inspection
methods past this optimum point result in a higher total cost.
This case also shows that in spite of inadequate component inspection
owners should take steps to ininimize the penalty costs even after award of
the contract. In this case if the resident engineer had allowed the
contractor to continue with spot removal the cost of the change would have
been greater and the quality of the final product would have been less.
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PENALTY COST = $57. IK AT 184% ERROR
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7.4 State of Vermont - Hartland, Hartford and Sharon bridges
The scope of this project was the repair to deteriorated sections of
concrete bridge decks on three bridges in Vermont. The extent of the
deteriorated concrete on these bridges was underestimated in the contract
documents. The percent error between estimated and actual quantities was
172%. The owner granted a time extension to complete the added work and
the time extension did not run the work into adverse weather. However, the
time extension would have been avoidable if the quantity of work had been
known. Therefore, this case is an example of error scenario F - option 2
as discussed in the component defect analysis framework. The penalty cost
equation that applies in this case is equation number 19 as shown below:
FC=DC+OH+NC+ ICA (19)
7.4.1 Penalty costs
The cost of the work for bridge 58A increased by $101K from the
original bid amount of $75K to $176K. The increase is attributed to the
increase in the quantities of class 2 concrete removal that were required.
In this case the amount of penalty costs were minimized by the contact
provisions the owner had included in the contract. Normally in this error
scenario the owner would have been subject to similar penalty cost having
to do with all the terms shown in the penalty cost equation. However, in
this case the owner was able to avoid some of these penalty costs by
including a provision in the contract that pre-priced the added work if the
required quantities increased dramatically. This was done by stating that
if upon removal of the asphalt wearing course the extent of the
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deteriorated concrete was discovered to be greater than estimated the
ownercould order class 1 or 2 removal over the entire deck and the price
would be 90% of the bid price for that bridge only. So instead of spot
removal and replacement of concrete, concrete would be removed over the
entire deck to either class 1 or 2 and then replaced with a continuous
concrete overlay and the contractor would be paid 90% of the bid price.
Without this contract provision the owner would likely have paid the
bid unit price for the additional work on bridge 58A and the associated
penalty costs. It would have been far more difficult for the owner to
obtain any price concessions at the negotiation table for the benefits the
contractor receives from the learning curve and overabsorbed overhead
costs. By recovering 10% of the bid unit price up front the owner avoided
some of these penalty costs and minimized the cost of adding these
quantities of work after the award of the contract.
This analysis will calculate the penalty costs with and without the
90% contract provision to see how effective this contractual arrangement
was in lowering the penalty costs as compared to how effective other
component inspection method would have been.
A summary of the increases in the quantities and the extended prices









CLASS 1 5 180 162
CLASS 2 79 720 180 162
TOTAL 84 720
EXTENDED PRICE $






If the 90% contract provision had not been included the penalty costs
would have included the following, as explained below:
Direct penalty cost - DC $12,451
Overhead penalty cost - OH $11,070
Internal contract administration - ICA $2,214
TOTAL $25,735
The direct penalty costs (DC) are associated with the learning curve
and represent the lower cost the contractor would have bid if he had known
the quantities were going to be this great. The calculations for this
amount are shown below:









85 168 84 $77.76
(90% X $86.40)
$8.64 $726
169 336 168 $69.98
(90% X $77.76)
$16.42 $2756
337 672 336 $62.99
(90% X $69.98)
$23.41 $7866
673 720 47 $62.99* $23.41 $1100
total saving due to learning curve that is penalty cost: $12,451
* Assume no further reduction in labor costs associated with
additional quantities since quantity of work added would have to
increase to 1,344 (672 x 2) to obtain another 10% reduction.
The overhead penalty costs (OH) are based on fixed overhead costs
that would have been paid on the added quantities of work. They are
calculated using the proportionality factor A2 as follows:
A2 x Q = OH
10% x [$129,600 - (1.25 x $15,120)] = $11,070
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The internal administration penalty costs (ICA) are calculated using
A6 as follows:
A6 x Q = ICA
2% X [$129,600 - (1.25 X $15,120)] = $2,214
The penalty costs calculated above ($25,811) assumed that the 90%
contract provision was not included in the contract. However, with the
90% contract provision a portion of these penalty costs were recovered
through the reduction in the unit price. The amount of penalty cost
recovered by this contract provision is the price for the work at the
unit price less the price the same work at the 90% unit price.
Therefore, the penalty costs incurred with the 90% contract provision are
the penalty costs calculated above less the penalty costs that were
recovered as shown below:
$25,735 - ($129,600 - $116,640) = $12,775
The penalty costs with the contract provision were half of the
amount without the contract provision. Figure 7.3 shows the penalty
costs curve both with and without the 90% contract provision.
7.4.2 Actual component inspection method and cost
For this case the standard bridge inspection procedures were used to
estimate the guantities of work. As in the previous case this is
estimated to be $1000 per bridge or a total of $3000. Therefore using
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PENALTY COST WITHOUT CONTRACT PROVISION = $26K AT 172% ERROR
PENALTY COST WITH CONTRACT PROVISION = $13K AT 172% ERROR





ACTUAL AND IR 2 5.8 100%
ACTUAL, TJR AND GPR 3 6.6 50%






7.4.3 Alternate component inspection methods and costs
The state could have used infrared thermography (IR) as an alternate
component inspection method and used this in conjunction with their
standard bridge inspection procedures. The size of the three bridge
decks is 28,000 SF. The cost of the IR would be $2,800 based on $0.10
per SF. The total cost of these two methods would have been $5.8K. The
percent error using this method could reasonably be estimated at 100%.
The state could also have used ground penetrating radar and IR in
conjunction with the standard method. The estimated cost of this
multiple sensor method would be $0.13 per SF. The cost for the IR and
GPR survey is $3,640, for a total cost of $6.6K. The estimated accuracy
of this method is 50%.
The state could also have supplemented the last method with
selective demolition and half-cell potential tests. This would have
added $6.5K to the cost of the previous method; $5K for the selective
demolition and $1.5K for the half-cell tests. The addition of these
method would have lowered the percent error to an estimated 25%.
These alternate component inspection methods and their costs are
shown on Figure 7.3.
7.4.4 Total costs
Review of the total cost curve in this case shows that the
combination of the actual method with IR and GPR produced the optimum
total cost. This was true with and without the 90% contract provision.
The total cost with the 90% contract provision (W/CP in Figure 7.3) was
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lowered from $16K to $8.8K by investing $3.6K more in component inspection
at the beginning of the project. Without the contract provision (W/0 in
Figure 7.3) the total cost was lowered from $29K to $11K by investing
$3.6K more in component inspection.
This case also shows that creative contract provisions can be
significant in recovering the penalty costs the owner would have paid due
to inadequate component inspection methods. The use of the 90% contract
provision cut the penalty costs in half. This reduced the total cost from
$29K to $16K with no investment in component inspection. The fact that
no added component inspection cost is needed makes the benefit obtained
from these provisions greater than the benefit of more accurate component
inspection methods.
7.5 Fairchild Air Force Base
This project provided various repairs to the concrete portions of the
runway. The extent of three of the work items in this contract were
incorrectly described in the contract documents as shown below. Work
items 2 and 3 were overestimated and item 1 was underestimated. In all
three cases the degree of error in describing the extent of the defect
exceeded the contract variance threshold. This particular contract is




EST ACT % UNIT BID FINAL
QUANT QUANT ERROR PRICE AMOUNT AMOUNT
ITEM
1. 3"-9" SPALL 29,000 45,135 56% $12.74 $369K $575K
REPAIR (SF)
2. >9" SPALL 20,000 13,835 -31% $19.60 $392K $271K
REPAIR (SF)
3. SEAL FCC 25,000 6,600 -73% $1.10 $27. 5K $7.26K
CRACKS(LF)
7.5.1 Penalty costs
Penalty costs for this case are derived from each of the three work
items in which an error in the estimated quantities was made. This
section will look at the penalty costs for each of these work items
separately.
Item 1 - Spall repair 3" - 9"
This is an example of error scenario F - option 1 in which the extent
of the defect was underestimated and the owner did not grant a time
extension. The penalty costs equation that applies to this case in
equation number 17 as follows:
PC = DC + OH+IM + NC+ICA (17)
The premium of $80K discussed in Chapter Four represents the direct
penalty costs. This cost was caused by the owner's requirement for the
contractor to finish the work without a time extension. This requirement
caused the contractor to have to work overtime and additional shifts to
complete the added quantities. This additional cost is attributed to the
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overtime and shift work, the loss of labor efficiency, additional material
and freight costs, and additional equipment rental costs. These costs
would not have been incurred if the owner had not required that the added
work for this item be completed within the original schedule.
The overhead penalty costs stem from the fact that the contractor was
paid at the bid price for the additional quantities of work over 115%. At
115% all fixed overhead costs have been paid by the preceding units of
work and any further compensation represents overabsorbed fixed overhead
costs. These overhead penalty costs are calculated as 10% of the cost of
the added work greater than the contract variance threshold as follows:
A2 x Q = OH
10% X [45,135 SF - (1.15 X 29,000 SF)] X $12.74/SF = $15,014
The internal contract administration penalty costs are calculated as
2% of the added amount of work or:
A6 x Q = ICA
2% x [45,135 SF - (1.15 x 29,000 SF) ] x $12.74/SF = $3,013
Impact costs and negotiated penalty costs did not occur in this
case. The total penalty costs for this item of work are:
Direct penalty costs - DC 80,332
Overhead penalty costs - OH 15,014
Internal contract administration - ICA 3.013
TOTAL Penalty costs work item 1 $98,359
Item 2 - Spall repair greater than 9M
The extent of this defect was overestimated and the error is
classified as error scenario E. The penalty cost equation for this work
item is equation number 16 that considers the penalty costs associated
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with the deleted work (PC2) using the variable Q2 as follows:
PC2 = DC + OH + NC + ICA (16)
In this case there were no direct penalty costs associated with this
work item. This could be explained by the fact that work item 1 and 2 are
similar in nature. Thus the causes of direct penalty costs in work item 2
may have been eliminated. An example is pre-purchased materials for work
item 2 that could be used in work item 1, thus eliminating any penalty .
costs for work item 2.
The overhead penalty costs in this work item are associated with the
underabsorbed fixed overhead costs. This amount is calculated as 10% of
the deleted work as follows:
A2 x Q2 = OH
10% x [(85% x 20,000 SF) - 13,835 SF] x $19.60/SF = $6,203
The internal contract administration penalty costs are calculated as
2% of the added amount of work or:
A6 x Q2 = ICA
2% X [(85% x 20,000 SF) - 13,835 SF] X $19.60/SF = $1,241
For a total of $7,444 in penalty costs for this work item.
Item 3 - Random PCC Cracks.
Like item 2 the extent of this defect was overestimated which is
error scenario E. Using the same equation number 16 the underabsorbed
fixed overhead costs and the internal administration costs are calculated
as follows:
10% x [(25,000LF X 85%) - 6,600LF] x $1.10/LF = $1,612 = OH
2% x [(25,000LF X 85%) - 6,600LF] X $1.10/LF = $267 = ICA
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For a total of $2,017 in penalty costs for this work item. There were no
direct penalty costs for this work item due to the minor cost of this work
item (1% of the contract value).
For all of these work items there are no negotiated penalty costs
since the amount of the changed work was priced based on bid unit prices.
The $80K that was a negotiated costs was included as a direct penalty
costs, so therefore it is not counted twice.
In summary, the penalty costs for each work items are as follows:
PENALTY COST %ERROR ERROR SCENARIO
ITEM 1 $98,359 +56% F - 1
ITEM 2 $7,444 -31% E
ITEM 3 $1,879 -73% E
A comparison of the penalty costs for the three work items shows that
the penalty costs for work item 2 and 3 are relatively insignificant
compared to item 1. The penalty costs for work items 2 and 3 are also
insignificant compared to the costs of alternate component inspection
methods that could improve the accuracy of the estimate for these work
item and thus lower these penalty costs. In other words, the cost of the
more accurate component inspection method would be more than any savings
that could be obtained by lowering the penalty cost. Because of this
comparative insignificance work items 2 and 3 will not be considered in
the remainder of this analysis. The penalty cost associated with work
item 1 is significant, and alone it makes the consideration of alternate
more costly component inspection methods worthwhile.
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7.5.2 Actual ccatponent inspection method and cost
The estimated quantities for this contract were identified through a
visual inspection. During this inspection "redding" was used to detect
spalls. This method is based on the same principle as chain drag. The
survey also used the presence of asphalt patches to identify areas that
had been temporarily repaired and needed to be permanently repaired with
concrete.
This component inspection method was restricted by the needs of the
user. The survey team was allowed on the runway for approximately 30
minutes and then required to get off to allow aircraft to use the runway
for approximately the same time. With this restriction approximately 10%
of the runway was surveyed and this data was extrapolated to obtain the
estimated quantities. This survey took five men one month to complete.
At an estimated $40,000 per year for each man, or $14 per hour, the
component inspection method cost:
$14/HR x 5 men x 8HR/day x 5days/week x 4 weeks = $11,200
7.5.3 Alternate component inspection methods and cost
An alternate method that could have been used would be for the owner
to continue as they were and do twice as much of the redding. This would
have doubled the cost of the effort to $22. 4K. If this was done twice the
amount of the airfield would have been surveyed and the degree of error
could have been improved to an estimated 50%.
The owner could have selected infrared thermography (IR) as an
alternate component inspection method. Although a reasonable cost for
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this method on a bridge was discussed in the previous case as $0.10 per
square foot, this does not take into account the economies of scale that
can be obtained on an airfield pavement. The unit cost of this component
inspection method can be lowered by the sheer size of the facility.
Figure 7.4 shows how this lower price can be calculated. This calculation
gives an order of magnitude cost per SF for this component inspection
method.
In this project there was 1.6 million SF of POC pavement to survey.
Using the above unit cost for this method the total cost would be:
1.6 X 10
6
SF x $0,021 per SF = $33,600
Although this method is able to detect thermal discontinuity in
pavement, it is unlikely that it could have detected the depth of the
spalls or effectively identified the PCC cracks. Therefore, the percent
error that this method alone could achieve is estimated to be 35%. There
are other component inspection methods and sensors that are better suited
to determine the depth of spalls and to more clearly identify cracks.
To improve this percent error the owner could have selected an
alternate component inspection method for this project that employed a van
equipped to perform several methods simultaneously. Several sensors and
the data recording equipment could be mounted on the same van. This van
would contain ground penetrating radar, infrared thermography and video
imaging sensors and recorders. These methods combined could readily




COST OF AIRFIELD IR SURVEY
FIGURE 7.4
Calculate the reasonable cost of an IR survey of an airfield due to
the economies of scale gained in through the sheer size of the airfield.
Given: IR cost for bridge decks: $0.10 per SF
A van equipped with IR sensors and data recording
equipment can do 10 average bridges per day. An average
bridge is estimated to be an area 56' x 600' = 33,600 SF.
Calculate: Area covered in one day is:
33,600 SF/bridge x 10 bridges/day = 336,000 SF/day
Cost of one day of work is:
336,000 SF/day x $0.10 per SF = $33,600 per day
Therefore: One day of data collection, processing and interpretation
costs $33,600. Most of the day is spent setting up the
van and traveling from bridge to bridge. In fact at 5
MPH and a 10' path width only 8 minutes is spent actually
collecting the data for one bridge.
If IR was used on an airfield there would be no travel time between
facilities and the set up time would be minimal. Therefore most of the
day, say 6 out of 8 hours a day, could be spent collecting data. There is
a tremendous economy of scale to be gained when this method is used on an
airfield as compared to a bridge deck.
Calculate: How much airfield pavement could be surveyed in a 6 hour
day at 5 MPH.
10 'path x 5280'/mi x 5MPH x 6 hour/day = 1.584xl06 SF/day
Therefore: If one day of IR survey costs $33,600, then a approximate
estimate of the cost per SF is:
$33,600 per day / 1.584xl06 SF per day = $0.021 per SF
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As in the previous bridge case the cost of the method increases
somewhat when additional sensors are added to the process. For airfields
a unit cost of $0.03 per SF will be used as reasonable. This is an
increase of 40% over the single sensor survey of $0,021 per SF.




SF x $0.03 per SF = $48,000
Because of the increase in the amount of information produced and the
capabilities of the sensors in this method it is assumed that this method
would yield a 20% error for each of the three defects.
In an effort to increase the accuracy of the estimate for this work
item even further the owner could have selected the previous method for
$48,000 and combined it with more rodding. The redding could have
confirmed the results of the non-contact method and increased the accuracy
of this combination of methods to an estimated 10%.
These alternative component inspection methods are summarized with
the plot of the penalty cost curves on Figure 7.5.
7.5.4 Total costs
Review of the total cost curve in this case shows that the multi-
sensor method is the optimum component inspection method providing the
minimim total cost. The total cost is reduced from $109. 2K to $59. 9K by
investing $36. 8K more on component inspection at the outset of the
project. Spending more on component inspection past this point in an
effort to reduce penalty costs causes the total costs curve to increase.
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More rodding is beneficial, but only to a minor extent. The total
cost curve is reduced only $3. IK. The multiple sensor method is the
optimum component inspection method from a total cost perspective.
7.6 Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota
The scope of this project was repairs to the airfield pavements at
the Minot Air Force Base. The unit price contract was awarded in April of
1986. Errors were made in describing the extent of two of the unit price
items of work on the contract. The owner granted a time extension to
complete the extra work and this extension ran the work into a winter
exclusion period in which the work had to be halted until the spring. The
contract included the standard federal contract clause regarding a 15%
contract variance threshold.
7.6.1 Penalty costs
The repair contract was awarded for $1,539K and the final contract
price was $2,458K. This increase can be attributed to the added quantity
of PCC spall repair (work item 2) required. The following schedule shows



















124,000 50,842 -59% $1.25/LF $155K $64K
26,500 115,392 +335% $12.34/SF $327K $1,424K

The penalty costs for each of these defects will be examined
separately.
Item 1 - FCC crack repair
Item 1 was overestimated which is an example of error scenario E in
the component defect analysis framework. The penalty cost equation that
applies is equation number 16 as follows:
PC2 = DC + OH + NC + ICA (16)
In this case there were no direct penalty costs associated with this work
item. In this case the magnitude of work item 2 overshadowed any direct
penalty costs associated with work item 1.
The overhead penalty costs in this work item are associated with
underabsorbed overhead costs. This amount is calculated as 10% of the
deleted work using the relationship from Chapter Six as follows:
A2 x Q2 = OH
10% X [(124,000 LF X 85%) - 50,842 LF] X $1.25/LF = $6,820
The internal contract administration costs penalty costs are
calculated as 2% of the cost of the change:
A6 x Q2 = ICA
2 % X [(124,000 LF X 85%) - 50,842 LF] x $1.25/LF = $1,605
For a total of $8,425 in penalty costs for this work item.
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Item 2 - POC spall repair
Item 2 is an example of error scenario F - option 3. The quantity of
work was underestimated and the owner granted a time extension which ran
the work into the winter and the adverse weather made it impractical to
continue with the work. The contractor demobilized for the winter and
returned in the spring to finish. The penalty cost equation that applies
in this case is number 20 as follows:
PC=DC+OH+IM+NC+ICA (20)
The direct penalty costs associated with the benefit the contractor
gained from the learning curve that was not passed on to the owner are
calculated below:
CALCULATION OF DIRECT PENALTY COSTS DUE TO LEARNING CURVE
UNITS AVERAGE LABOR SAVINGS
FROM TO QUANT COSTS PER UNIT PER UNIT TOTAL
1 26,500 26,500 $5.92
(48% X $12.34)
26,501 53,000 26,500 $5.33
(90% X $5.92)
$0.59 $15,635
53,001 106,000 53,000 $4.80
(90% X $5.33)
$1.12 $59,360
.06,001 115,392 9,392 $4.80* $1.12 $10,519
Total saving due to learning curve that is direct penalty cost: $85,514
* Assume no further reduction in labor cost due to increase in quantities.
In this case the contractor did not request any additional
compensation for direct costs as in the previous airfield case. It is
possible that since a time extension was granted, and the contractor did
not have to accelerate the work, he did not incur any additional direct
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costs that were not covered by the unit price. This is quite likely since
the owner did not force the contractor to increase his output to meet the
original completion date.
The overhead penalty costs are those fixed overhead costs paid on the
units of work in excess of the contract variance threshold. If the extent
of this defect had been known at the time of award the owner would have
made arrangements to insure that the work did not take two seasons to
complete. Examples of this include, dividing the work into two contracts,
telling the contractor at the outset what his rate of production must be
or structuring the contract requirements so that he can realistically
finish in a season. For this reason these fixed overhead costs are
penalty costs. These overhead penalty costs are calculated using A2 in
the following relationship:
A2 x Q = OH
10% X [(115,392 SF - (1.15 X 26,500 SF) ] X $12.34/SF = $104,787
The internal contract administration penalty costs are as follows:
A6 x Q = ICA
2% X [(115,392 SF - (1.15 X 26,500 SF) ] X $12.34/SF = $20,959
There were no impact penalty costs in this case.
In summary the penalty costs for these defects was as follows:
WORK ITEM 1 Overhead penalty costs - OH $6,820
Internal administration - ICA $1,605
Total penalty costs item 1 $8,425
WORK ITEM 2 Direct penalty costs - DC 85,514
Overhead penalty costs - OH $104,778
Internal administration - ICA $20.959
Total penalty costs item 2 $211,251
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As in the previous case the penalty costs associated with work item 1
are insignificant when compared to the penalty costs for work item 2 and
the cost of alternate more component inspection methods that could lower
the penalty costs. For this reason work item 1 will not be considered any
further in this analysis.
7.6.2 Actual component inspection method and cost
The component inspection method used to determine the estimated
quantities for this contract were chain drag combined with a visual
inspection. The work was done in house by the base pavement engineer. No
consultant was hired to assist or perform the work. The pavement engineer
related a number of problems with this method:
1) This method is very time consuming so the entire airfield area
could not be surveyed in the time that was available.
2) The time spent in surveying impacted on the airfield operations
and restricted the time that could be spent on the survey.
3) Interference from jet aircraft noise makes the chain drag method
especially difficult to use.
For these reasons only a small portion of the airfield was surveyed. The
extent of the defects obtained from this limited survey was extrapolated
to obtain the quantity of the defects for the entire airfield pavement to
be repaired under this contract.
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This component inspection method involved the one person for the
period of four weeks. Ihe cost of this method based on an annual salary
of $40,000 is $3,077.
$40,000 x 4 weeks / 52 weeks per year = $3,077
7.6.3 Alternate component inspection methods and costs
Ihe owner could have selected more of the visual survey as an
alternate component inspection method. In this case more personnel could
have been assigned to the survey. If the four people had been assigned
for the same period of time the cost would have increased to $12,308.
Using this method it is reasonable to assume that the accuracy of the
estimated quantity would have improved by 20% to 268%.
A second component inspection method that that would have been
appropriate for the defects in this repair project would have been the
multiple sensor van used in the previous airfield case. This analysis
will look at several combinations of accuracies and costs for this method.
In this project there were 6.8 million SF of pavement to survey.
Using the cost per SF for this similar type of survey from the Fairchild
case the cost would be:
6,800,000 SF x $0.03 per SF = $204,000
As in the Fairchild case a percent error of 20% will be assumed as
reasonable. This type of survey of the entire area would have taken three
days at a 12 foot path width and 5 miles per hour.
If however, the owner wished to reduce the time and cost for the
survey by having the sensor van travel at a faster speed this would be
expected to increase the degree of error. If the speed of the van was
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doubled to 10 miles per hour, the cost would decrease by approximately 25%
since the cost of data processing would remain. The degree of error would
be expected to increase with this alternative to an estimated 50%.
The owner might also survey only half of the airfield pavement and
then use the quantities obtained from this to estimate the total
quantities for the project. This method would also reduce the cost and
the time to perform the component inspection. With this approach the cost
would be half since the amount of data processing would also be reduced.
The degree of error would increase again and could reasonably be estimated
as 100%.
CI METHOD % ERROR CI COST $
Multi-sensor @ 5 MPH 20% $204,000
Multi-sensor @ 10 MPH 50% $153,000
Multi-sensor 1/2 AREA 100% $102,000
These methods are shown with the plot of the penalty cost curve on
Figure 7.6.
7.6.4 Total costs
Review of the total cost curve for this case shows that a
multi-sensor method covering only one half of the airfield yielded the
optimum total cost. The penalty costs were reduced from $211K to $158K by
investing $102K in component inspection to utilize the multi-sensor
method. The investment in more accurate component inspection methods past
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7.7 Naval Air Station Brunswick
This project was a lump-sum contract to provide repairs to the
instrument runway. This is an example of error scenario F - option 1 in
which the degree to which the extent of the defect was underestimated and
the owner did not grant a time extension. However, this case is slightly
different in that the underestimate was so large that the method of repair
was inappropriate and had to be changed. Normally in error scenario F the
additional quantities of work are added to the contract and the contractor
continues with the same method of repair. In this case however, it was
infeasible to continue with the designed repair. The original design was
based on 9000 SF of distressed pavement. When the work was started the
extent of the distressed pavement had increased to 120,000 SF.
From Chapter Six the penalty cost equation that applies in this case
is equation number 17:
FC=DC+OH+IM+NC+ ICA (17)
7.7.1 Penalty costs
The amount of the change to the contract was $593K. If this added
work had been included in the contract documents it is estimated that the
added work would have cost $424K. The difference, $169K, is a penalty
cost. This added cost represents the penalty cost terms DC and NC that




The direct penalty costs (DC) are associated with the overtime and
shift work the contractor had to perform in order to get the work done
within the original schedule. The contractor worked seven days a week on
this job throughout the summer. Long hours such as these lower the
productivity of a contractor's crew and this increased labor cost must be
added to the cost of the work. The contractor had to mobilize all of his
productive effort, men and equipment, on this job in a short period of
time. This was not his plan when he bid the job. The fixed costs of this
increased mobilization effort and increasing the amount of equipment on
the job contributed to the cost.
The $169K cost also includes the negotiated penalty costs (NC)
associated with purchasing what under normal circumstances would have been
$424K worth of paving work on a negotiated basis.
There were no impact penalty costs (IM) or overhead penalty costs
(OH) in this case.
There were internal contract administration penalty costs. These are
2% of the cost of the added work:
A6 x Q = ICA
2% X $593K = $12K
A summary of the penalty costs in this case are:
DC and NC $169K
ICA $12K
Total penalty costs $181K
Since this was a lump-sum contract no contract variance threshold had
been established that applied to the increased amount of distressed
pavement. However, there is a certain increased quantity of component
defect that would trigger the start of penalty costs. In effect the
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contract variance threshold is the level of error at which penalty costs
are incurred as a result of a contract change caused by inadequate
component inspection. In this case if the amount of distressed pavement
had increased up to an estimated 30,000 SF the designed repair still would
have been acceptable. However, the increase to 120,00 SF was too great to
continue with the designed repair. Therefore, 30,000 SF will be used as
the contract variance threshold for this case. At this point the designed
repair had to be changed and penalty costs were incurred. The amount of
these penalty costs increase with increasing degree of error in describing
the extent of the defect.
For this analysis 0% error will be at 9000 SF of distressed
pavement. The contract variance threshold is 233% error calculated as:
[(30,000 - 9,000) / 9,000] X 100% = 233%
The percent error at $181K penalty costs is based on 9,000 SF and 120,000
SF calculated as follows:
[(120,000 - 9,000) / 9,000] X 100% = 1233%
Therefore, the penalty cost will be zero at 233% error and will increase
linearly up to 1,233% error.
7.7.2 Actual component inspection method and costs
As stated in Chapter Four the the component inspection method used in
1985 was not itself inadequate, it correctly identified the extent of the
defects in the airfield at that time. However, to be considered adequate
the component inspection decisions made by the owner must take into
account the fact that deterioration is time dependent. In this case the
methods used by the owner after 1985 failed to detect this change in the
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amount of distressed pavement. Therefore, the series or combinations of
component inspection methods the owner selected for use were inadequate
since the final result was that the extent of the distressed pavement was
incorrectly described and this resulted in a contract change.
Ihe actual component inspection method used in 1985 included a visual
inspection, topographic survey and soil borings to confirm the strength of
the sub-base material. This survey noted that the pavement was beginning
to show signs of deterioration. The major areas of concern were
longitudinal and transverse cracks, and alligator cracking. The method
used in this survey determined that there was 100,000 LF of transverse and
longitudinal cracks and 9,000 SF of distressed pavement such as alligator
cracking. The cost of this method was $15K.
7.7.3 Alternate component inspection methods and costs
The most obvious alternate component inspection method that the owner
could have used to prevent these penalty costs would have been to perform
a confirmation survey prior to advertising this contract. This type of
survey would involve simply confirming if the conditions are the same or
worse than those described on the contract documents. The estimated cost
of this method would be $3K. If this method had been selected by the
owner the increased extent of the deterioration would have been detected
and the contract could have been amended prior to bid. The contractor
would have bid on the correctly described work and the owner would have
avoided the penalty costs.
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On the other hand, it is possible that the increased deterioration
occurred after the contract was awarded, during the second winter, prior
to the start of work (contract award was in fall 1986). In this case a
confirmation survey in 1986, prior to the award, would not have detected
this accelerated deterioration.
However, if a confirmation survey had been done in 1986 it is quite
likely that some additional quantities of work would have been detected.
It is doubtful that the entire amount of pavement distress occurred over
the second winter and that none occurred over the first winter.
Therefore, it seems reasonable that a confirmation survey would have at
least informed the owner about a portion the increased extent of
distressed pavement and alerted to the possibility of increased
deterioration during the upcoming winter. With this information
arrangements could be made to halt the deterioration during the second
winter or to plan for the likelihood of increased quantities of work in
the upcoming contract and examine the effect that would have on the
designed repair.
The owner could also have considered an alternate contractual
arrangement that may have enabled a portion of the penalty costs to be
avoided. If the owner had included a unit price item for additional
asphalt patching work, at least the price for the this work would have
been pre-priced. The disadvantage to this approach would be if the
estimated quantities failed to materialize then there would have been
penalty costs associated with a error scenario E situation.
In summary, it would be reasonable to say that if the owner had
employed a confirmation survey in 1986 the increased amount of distressed
pavement would have been detected. If this had been done presumably the
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owner would order a second complete survey as was done in 1987 at a cost
of $15K. The amount of distress would have been measured and as a result
of this combination of methods the degree of error would be reduced to an
estimated 300% and the penalty cost would have been lower as shown on the
penalty cost curve. Ihe total cost of this combination of component
inspection methods is now $33K; $30K for the first and second surveys and
$3K for the confirmation survey.
An alternate component inspection method the owner could have used in
the original survey was video imaging. The cost would have been $37. 8K
assuming a unit cost similar to that of previous non-contact methods.
200 LF X 7,000 LF X $0,027 PER SF = $37,800
If this had been done in 1985 a confirmation survey in 1986 could have
used the same method and the data collected could have simply been
compared. This would have told the owner more accurately the increase in
the distress. The owner could have used this information to determine if
the contract documents were still adequate. The cost of this second
survey would be less since it was a resurvey and the cost could be
estimated as 60% of the original survey or $22. 8K. The accuracy of using
this method could reduce the degree of error again by approximately one
half to 150%
These alternate component inspection methods are shown with the plot
of the penalty cost curve in Figure 7.7.
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Review of the total cost curve for this case shows that it is
worthwhile for the owner to employ a combination of component inspection
methods to address the issue of deterioration being time dependent. This
is true even if this involves repeating the same methods at a later date.
If the owner had decided to use a confirmation survey and then had
followed up with a resurvey the savings in penalty costs would have been
significant. This action would have reduced the total costs from $196K to
$45K by investing $18K more in component inspection. If the owner had
invested in a video survey the total costs, although higher, would still
have been significantly less than $196K.
7.8 Summary
This chapter presented six major facility repair projects in which
inadequate component inspection caused a contract change and penalty
costs. The penalty costs were calculated using the penalty cost equations
developed in Chapter Six. The cost of the component inspection method
actually used in the case and the cost of alternate component inspection
methods were calculated. The penalty costs and the component inspection
costs were combined to produce a total cost curve. Analysis of the total
cost curve revealed an optimum component inspection method for each
scenario. In all the cases the optimum method was more expensive than the
actual method, however this resulted in lower total costs. The existence
of this optimum component inspection method showed that it was beneficial
for the owner to spend more on component inspection in order to lower the
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penalty costs associated with inadequate component inspection and reduce
the total cost of the project.
Each of these cases was classified by error scenario (A - F) as
described in the component defect analysis framework. Although there were
six cases, two of these involved errors made in more than one defect so
there are nine error scenarios in all. Of the nine error scenarios six
were classified as error scenario F and three error scenario E. There
were no examples of error scenarios A through D.
From this one might conclude that error scenarios A through D are not
representative of the errors that occur in component inspection. However,
it is quite likely that if an exhaustive search was conducted that
numerous examples of the other scenarios could be found. It may be that
error scenarios E and F are more prevalent in airfield pavement and bridge
deck repair projects. These two scenarios may also occur more frequently
when dealing with unit price contracts, since the very nature of a unit
price contract lends itself to situations where there is some uncertainty
associated with the quantity of work. Although the cases presented here
have not proven the existence of error scenarios A - D, it would be
erroneous, because of the small number of cases presented, to conclude
they have been disproved.
The component defect analysis framework did a fairly good job of
predicting the types of penalty costs that would occur in each of the nine
error scenarios. In most cases the penalty costs terms that were
indicated in the equations did occur. The exceptions were the impact cost
(IM) and the negotiated penalty cost (NC) terms. These two terms did not




Hie direct penalty cost term also did not occur in the error
scenarios classified as E, although it was shown in the equations. This
is attributed to the fact that any direct penalty costs on the error
scenario E work items were overshadowed by the magnitude of the direct
penalty costs for the error scenario F work items in the same project. If
this overshadowing had not happened it is quite likely that the direct
penalty cost term would have occurred and the penalty costs for this error
scenario would have been more significant.
The minimal nature of the penalty costs in the error scenario E cases
caused by the lack of direct penalty costs might lead one to conclude that
to reduce penalty costs the owner should purposefully overestimate the
quantity of work. Although this may be true, the evidence presented here
does not entirely support such a conclusion. Unfortunately there were no
cases where the error scenario E was independent of any other errors. The
penalty costs of error scenario E were always effected by the association
with an error scenario F work item within the same contract. Therefore,
the penalty costs associated with the error scenario E work items were in
all likelihood artificially lower than they should have been.
In conclusion, it would be fair to say that in these cases if the
owners had known the outcome of their decisions with regard to component
inspection they would have made different decisions. They would have
selected another component inspection method, restructured the contract
for the work or inserted a creative contract provision. The question
after reviewing these cases seems to be how can situations like these be
prevented in the future? How can facility owners anticipate these penalty
costs and take measures prior to the award of the contract to avoid these
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added costs and delays? What component inspection decisions should owners
be making to minimize changes due to inadequate component inspection?
CHAPTER SEVEN ENDNOTES:
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This chapter will review the evidence presented in this thesis and
evaluate the thesis objectives.
8.1 Overview of thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effect of inadequate
component inspection on major facility repair projects. The methodology
for doing this was to determine the relationship between the cost of
component inspection methods and the penalty costs associated with
inadequate component inspection. This relationship was analyzed to see if
it supported the selection of more costly component inspection methods,
especially methods that employ non-contact automated sensing
technologies. With this insight, this thesis explored how this
relationship between component inspection cost and penalty cost might be
used to help owners make a priori decisions regarding the selection of
component inspection methods for facility repair projects.
Although the scope of this investigation has been limited to airfield
pavements and concrete bridge decks, the concepts regarding component




8.2 Relationship between component inspection cost and penalty cost
Through the use of the concept presented in Chapter Two, showing the
total cost curve as the sum of the component inspection cost and the
penalty cost, the thesis was able to examine how the selection of more
costly component inspection methods effected the total cost curve. In
each of the six cases the application of more costly component inspection
methods produced a total cost curve in which an optimum method was
evident.
Figure 8.1 shows a summary of the data obtained from the six cases.
In each case, for both the actual and the optimum component inspection
methods, the component inspection cost and the percent error are shown.
The difference in the total cost between the actual and the optimum method
is also shown. This difference is the savings that the owner could have
expected if the more costly optimum component inspection method had been
used. This savings is further expressed in Figure 8.1 as: 1) a percent of
the additional component inspection cost required to employ the optimum
method as opposed to the actual method, and 2) as a percent of the project
cost when completed (including changes). The first percentage shows the
owner's rate of return on the investment in more costly component
inspection methods. In only one case, number 5, was the amount of the
savings in total cost less than the investment in component inspection.
None the less, in all cases there was a savings to the owner by employing
the optimum method.
The second percentage shows the percent savings on the entire project
that the owner could expect by investing in the optimum component
inspection method. This percentage ranges from 1.7% to 7.6% of the
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<SAVINGS IN TC3TAL COST
$ K % OF ADDED % OF FINAL
CASE METHOD ERROR SK CI COST* PROJECT COST
1 ACTUAL 154 3.0
VERMONT 17.2 506% 4.6%
MIDDLESEX OPTIMUM 50 6.4
2 ACTUAL 184 3.0
VMB 34.1 243% 2.6%
MAINE OPTIMUM 50 17.0
ACTUAL 172 3.0
3






4 ACTUAL 56 11.2
FAIRCHILD 49.3 133% 3.1%
AFB OPTIMUM 20 48.0
5 ACTUAL 335 3.1
MINOT 56.1 57% 2.3%
AFB OPTIMUM 100 102.0
6 ACTUAL 1233 15.0
BRUNSWICK 150.9 838% 7.6%
MAINE OPTIMUM 300 33.0
* Calculated as follows:
SAVING IN TOTAL COST / [ (CI COST OPTIMUM - CI COST ACTUAL) ]
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project cost. This evidence shows that in this application it is
beneficial to select more costly component inspection methods.
This total cost relationship and the data presented here illustrate
the importance of owner's decisions with regard to component inspection
methods and the impact these decisions have on major facility repair
projects. In each of these cases the owner could have saved several
percent of the project cost by selecting more costly methods.
The total cost relationship used in this analysis was dependent to
some degree on the percent error and cost that was estimated for each of
the alternate component inspection methods that were selected for
analysis. The percent error estimated for each of the alternate component
inspection methods used in the analysis were reasonable, however, they are
not known with any degree of certainty. By using these methods in the
field and comparing the actual and estimated quantities for numerous
projects, the day to day accuracies produced by these methods could be
determined with some level of certainty. This is an area where additional
research needs to be done.
The costs used for the component inspection methods evaluated in this
analysis are reasonable estimates. The actual cost of the in-house
methods may be greater than estimated because they are subsidized to some
degree and the estimate does not reflect the true cost of the effort. On
the other hand, the cost of the newer non-contact automated methods will
decrease in the foreseeable future because of the dependence these methods
have on sensors and computers that are becoming less expensive each year
in the general market place.
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The percent error estimates used in the analysis also indicate what
the performance capabilities of these methods must be in order to make a
difference. Because of the nature of the total cost curve in most cases
it is not necessary to reduce the degree of error to the contract variance
threshold in order to have any benefit. Simply lowering the degree of
error from the stratospheric levels will lower the total cost. It is
interesting to note accuracies in the range of 25% to 50% would have
improved the total costs of the cases that were analyzed.
In summary, this evidence indicates that as an owner it would be
beneficial to select component inspection methods that are more costly and
yield improved levels of accuracy. The added cost of these methods will
be paid for by the reduced penalty costs that result from their use. It
is more cost effective from the perspective of total cost to fund
component inspection than to pay the penalty costs.
As an added point, the total cost does not consider the penalty costs
that were not quantified, such as user and political costs. If these are
taken into consideration it would seem even more appropriate to select
more costly component inspection methods that would increase the accuracy
of the estimated amount of work and allow the owner to avoid project
delays and loss of credibility.
8.3 Existing versus new component inspection methods
Evaluating the effect that more costly component inspection methods
have on facility repair projects also indicates something about the use of
existing methods versus the use of the newer non-contact automated
methods. In five of the six cases the optimum component inspection method
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included non-contact automated sensing technologies. This shows that
although these methods are typically more expensive than traditional
methods, they would be useful in this application. By selecting these
methods owners can reduce the total cost curve even though this will
require more funds for component inspection at the outset of the project.
The benefit of these methods will become even greater in the future as the
cost of these methods decrease.
8.4 Cto/ner policies for selecting component inspection methods
This section will analyze the general owner policies that should be
instituted based on the evidence presented in this thesis. These policies
are especially important now that facility repair work is taking up more
of these agencies resources and more facility repair projects are being
undertaken.
8.4.1 The selection of a component inspection method
The selection of a component inspection method is a decision the
owner must make during the design of a major facility repair project. In
making this decision owners should carefully consider all of the component
inspection methods that are available.
The evidence presented indicates that in a majority of the cases the
decision to select the component inspection method used was done without a
great deal of analysis. Many times the component inspection method used
was selected because that was the status quo. This was the case in
Vermont and Maine. The selection of a component inspection method in the
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Minot and Fairchild cases was also done without any formal analysis.
However, in these cases there was no precedent and the lack of experience
in performing the component inspection for this size repair effort may
have adversely effected the decision. In all cases failure to analyze and
consider the alternative component inspection methods available was a
factor.
Cost cutting seemed to be a motivational theme that existed to some
degree in all the cases, especially through the selection of in-house
methods for component inspection. This is to be expected since these
organizations are under extreme pressure to cut costs. However, as the
evidence in Figure 8.1 showed, selecting the least costly component
inspection method resulted in greater total costs. Selecting the more
costly optimum component inspection method lowered the total cost. The
decision to select one component inspection method over another should be
based on some objective analysis. An objective and logical analysis is
also necessary to justify the added cost of the more accurate component
inspection methods in the early stages of the project.
8.4.2 A component inspection strategy
This discussion regarding the selection of component inspection
methods prompts the another question that needs to be considered. What
about all the other projects in which the standard component inspection
methods were used, the actual quantities were within the contract variance
threshold and there were no penalty costs? Although this thesis did not
look for these cases, it would be fair to say that plenty of these cases
exist. So if they do exist, are they successful because the owner
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selected the best component inspection method based on a logical analysis
of the project characteristics, or are they successful because the best
component inspection method for that project just happened to be the one
that is the standard method?
This thesis has shown in the six cases presented that if alternate
component inspection methods had been selected the owner would have
benefited. However, this determination was made after the fact. If some
logical analysis had been used to select the component inspection method
would a better method have been selected during the design of the repair
project thus preventing the penalty costs.
This question points to the need for owners to establish a component
inspection strategy during the design of facility repair project. This
strategy would be specific to the project and describe the component
inspection method(s) that should be employed. The development of this
strategy would go hand in hand with the design of the repair project and
would be dependent on the defects the repair project was aimed at. This
strategy would be based on the logical analysis of the alternate component
inspection methods that are available.
The selection of a component inspection method should include the
development of a component inspection strategy that considers the penalty
costs of errors that could occur in the component inspection process.
This is where the use of the component defect analysis framework as an
analysis tool should become a part of the decision process to select a
component inspection method. A component inspection strategy for each
project should be developed and analyzed to see if it will provide the
lowest total cost to the project based on the estimated costs of the
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component inspection method and the penalty costs that are likely to
occur.
As shown in Chapter Seven, the component defect analysis framework
does a fairly good job of predicting the various types of penalty costs
that occurred in most of the cases. The penalty cost equations for each
scenario were useful in determining the magnitude of the penalty costs.
Therefore, this framework would be useful as a tool to help owners design
a component inspection strategy and select component inspection methods
for their facility repair projects.
8.4.3 The component defect analysis framework as a tool
The owner could use the component defect analysis framework as a tool
to design a component inspection strategy and choose between several
component inspection methods. This section will present an example of
where this would be useful by looking at the Vermont - Middlesex bridge
case.
This example will start with the things that are known by the owner.
First the defects that the project is trying to fix are known from
previous preliminary surveys, but the extent of the defects are still
unknown. In this case the defects are delaminations and punky concrete.
Both of these are repaired by the same method of repair, removal and
replacement of the concrete. This is the work item which an estimated
quantity must be determined.
Next the penalty costs are determined by reviewing the component
defect analysis diagram. For this defect the characteristic of severity
is not relevant, so the error scenarios that could occur are A, B, E and
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F. Error scenario A is not possible since the owner already knows that
some type of defect is present in the component and it is believed to be
the above. Error scenario B is possible since all the defects that are
believed to be delaminations could be debonding. This is not very likely,
but possible. Error scenarios E and F could also occur. Ihe penalty cost
equations for each of these scenarios can be used to calculate the penalty
costs for each error scenario as a function of the degree of error. In
regard to error scenario F, a "what if" approach could be used to look at
the effect of granting time extensions, whether they are avoidable or
unavoidable time extensions and the effect of adverse weather. From this
information the penalty cost curves can be determined.
The owner then selects several component inspection methods that
would be appropriate for the defects in the bridge deck. The expected
degree of accuracy of these alternate component inspection methods and
their costs would then be estimated.
This data could be combined with the penalty cost curves for each
error scenario to plot the total cost curve for each scenario. Analysis
of these total cost curves would indicate the optimum component inspection
method that would produce the lowest total costs for each error scenario
that could occur.
Ihe design of a component inspection strategy, performed before the
component inspection method is selected, could reduce the total cost of a
project. It could also be used to justify the expense associated with the
more accurate component inspection methods or the expense using an
equipment intensive component inspection methods, such as infrared or




This design strategy does not account for the penalty costs that were
not quantified in the penalty cost equations; user and political. If the
selection of one method over another was close based on the total cost
curve then these considerations could effect the decision.
Additionally, in proposing alternate component inspection methods to
include in the strategy it is important that they be acceptable. For
example, if closing the bridge to do coring is unacceptable to the user
then it should not be considered as an alternate component inspection
method even though it may produce the lowest total cost.
Owners should require their facilities organizations to adhere to
policies that consider alternate component inspection methods in the
design of major facility repair contracts. The requirement to develop a
component inspection strategy for each major facility repair project is
one of those policies.
8.4.4 Contractual arrangements
The Brunswick and the Vermont - Hartland cases point to the
importance of selecting the contractual arrangement for the work and the
bearing this can have on penalty costs. It appears from the evidence that
it may be possible for owners to achieve some of the same goals in regards
to reducing penalty costs through contractual arrangements as they can
through the use of more costly component inspection methods.
Additionally, these contractual arrangements sometimes take no more than
the stroke of a pen and can be accomplished at a fraction of the cost of
alternate component inspection methods with the same positive effect on
the total cost curve. As a part of the development of a component
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inspection strategy the contractual arrangement for the work should also
be considered.
One of the aspects of the contractual arrangement is the selection of
a contract variance threshold. Although in the cases presented the
contract variance threshold was standard for a contract issued by the same
owner, these owners should evaluate their contract variance threshold
policies in the light of the evidence presented here. They should
consider selecting contract variance thresholds individually for each
project based on the expected accuracy of the component inspection method
that is selected for use. This would be another way to minimize penalty
costs through the establishment of a contractual arrangement.
Ctoners should include arrangements to pre-price quantities work
outside the contract variance threshold. The state of Vermont did this
with success in the Hartland bridge case. In doing this they were able to
recover a portion of the penalty costs that they would have paid if the
arrangement had not been included.
The execution of lump-sum contracts for facility repair contracts
should be avoided when possible. The objective of repair projects is to
restore the effects of deterioration which in most cases is time
dependent. With the funding restrictions that public owners operate under
it quite normal for delays in award and early award of contracts to
result. Lump-sum contracts are not as adaptable as unit price contracts
when this occurs. Lump-sum contracts also tend to amplify the effects of
changes in the quantity of work. There is no established contract
variance threshold to dampen the effects of inaccuracies in component
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inspection methods or the effects of time dependent deterioration. The
case at Brunswick was an example of this.
Although these contractual arrangements are not component inspection
methods, they must be included as part of the component inspection
strategy for a facility repair project and instituted as part of the
design process. These contractual methods can be just as effective in
reducing the total cost as the selection of more accurate component




COMPONENT DEFECTS OF AIRFIELD PAVEMENTS
This appendix provides a brief description of the component defects
that occur in rigid and flexible airfield pavements as referenced in
Chapter Three.
RIGID AIRFIELD PAVEMENT DEFECTS:
The airfield pavement condition survey procedures used by the Navy
identify 15 defects that can occur in rigid airfield pavements:
A blow up occurs at a transverse crack or joint that is not wide enough to
permit expansion of the concrete slabs. The insufficient width is usually
caused by infiltration of incompressible materials into the joint space.
When expansion cannot relieve enough pressure, a localized upward movement
if the slab edges (buckling) or shattering will occur in the vicinity of
the joint. This type of distress is almost always repaired immediately
because of severe damage potential to aircraft.
A corner break is a crack that intersects the joints at a distance less
than or equal to one-half of the slab length on both sides, measured from
the corner of the slab. A corner break differs from a corner spall in
that the crack extends vertically through the entire slab thickness, while
a corner spall intersects the joint at an angle. Load repetition combined
with loss of support usually cause corner breaks.
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Longitudinal, transverse and diagonal cracks divide the slab into two or
three pieces and are usually caused by a combination of load repetition
and shrinkage stresses.
"D" cracking is caused by the concrete's inability to withstand
environmental factors such as freeze-thaw cycles. It usually appears as a
pattern of cracks running parallel to a joint or linear crack. A dark
coloring can usually be seen around the fine durability cracks. This type
of cracking may eventually lead to disintegration of the concrete within 1
to 2 feet of the joint or crack.
Joint seal damage is any condition which enables soil or rocks to
accumulate is the joints or allows significant infiltration of water.
Accumulation of incompressible materials prevents the slabs from expanding
and may result in buckling, shattering, or spalling. A pliable joint
filler bonded to the edges of the slabs protects the joints from
accumulation of materials and also prevents water from seeping down and
softening the foundation supporting the slab.
A patch is an area where the original pavement has been removed and
replaced by a filler material.
A utility cut is a patch that has replaced the original pavement because
of placement of underground utilities.
Bcpouts are small pieces of pavement that break loose from the surface due
to freeze-thaw action in combination with expansive aggregates.
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Pumping is the ejection of material by water through joints or cracks
caused by deflection of the slab under passing loads. As the water is
ejected, it carries particles of gravel, sand, clay, or silt resulting in
a progressive loss of pavement support. Surface staining and base or
subgrade material on the pavement close to joints or cracks are evidence
of pumping. Pumping near joints indicates poor joint sealer and loss of
support, which will lead to cracking under repeated loads.
Scaling, napcracking or crazing refers to a network of shallow, fine, or
hairline cracks that extend only through the upper surface of the
concrete. These defects may be caused by deicing salts, improper
construction, freeze-thaw cycles, and poor aggregate. Another recognized
source of distress is the reaction between the alkalies in some cements
and certain minerals in some aggregates. Products formed by the reaction
between the alkalies and aggregate result in expansions that cause
breakdown in the concrete. This generally occurs throughout the slab and
not just at joints where "D" cracking normally occurs.
Settlement or faulting is a difference of elevation at a joint or crack
caused by upheaval or consolidation.
Shattered slab are intersecting cracks that break the slab into four or
more pieces due to overloading and/or inadequate support.
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Shrinkage cracks are hairline cracks that are usually only a few feet long
and do not extend across the entire slab. They are formed during the
setting and curing of the concrete and usually do not extend through the
depth of the slab.
Spalling joints are the breakdown of the slab edges within 2 feet of the
side of the joint. A joint spall usually does not extend vertically
through the slab but intersects the joint at an angle. Spalling results
from excessive stresses at the joint or crack caused by infiltration of
incompressible materials or traffic load.
Spalling corner is the raveling or breakdown of the slab within
approximately 2 feet of the corner. A corner spall differs from a corner
break in that the spall usually angles downward to intersect the joint,
while a break extends vertically through the slab.
FLEXIBLE AIRFIELD PAVEMENT DEFECTS:
The condition survey procedures used by the Navy identify 16 defects that
can occur in flexible pavements:
Alligator cracking is a series of interconnecting cracks caused by fatigue
failure of the asphaltic concrete (AC) surface under repeated traffic
loading. The cracking initiates at the bottom of the AC surface where
tensile stress and strain are highest under a wheel load. The cracks
propagate to the surface initially as a series of parallel cracks. After
repeated traffic loading, the cracks connect, forming many sharp-angled
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pieces. Alligator cracking occurs in areas that are subjected to repeated
traffic loadings, such as wheel paths.
Bleeding is a film of bituminous material on the pavement surface that
creates a shiny, glass like, reflecting surface that usually becomes quite
sticky. Bleeding is caused by excessive amounts of asphalt cement in the
mix.
Block crackings are interconnected cracks that divide the pavement into
approximately rectangular pieces. Block cracking is caused mainly by
shrinkage of the asphaltic concrete and daily temperature cycling. The
occurrence of block cracking usually indicates that the asphalt has
hardened significantly.
Corrugation is a series of closely spaced ridges and valleys occurring at
fairly regular intervals along the pavement. The ridges are perpendicular
to the traffic direction. Traffic action combined with an unstable
pavement surface or base usually causes this type of distress.
Depressions are localized pavement surface areas having elevations
slightly lower than those of the surrounding pavement. Depressions can be
caused by settlement of the foundation soil or can be built during
construction. Depressions when filled with water can cause hydroplaning
of aircraft.
Jet blast erosion causes darkened areas on the pavement surface where
bituminous binder has been burned.
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Joint reflection (POC) is a distress that occurs where flexible pavements
are placed over a PCC slab. Joint reflection cracking is caused mainly by
movement of the PCC slab beneath the asphaltic concrete surface because of
thermal and moisture changes.
Longitudinal and transverse cracking - Longitudinal cracks are parallel to
the center line or the direction in which the pavement was laid down.
They are caused by 1) a poorly constructed paving lane joint, 2) shrinkage
of the AC surface due to low temperatures or hardening of the asphalt, or
3) a reflective crack caused by cracks beneath the surface course,
including cracks in PCC slabs. Transverse cracks extend across the
pavement at approximately right angles to the center line or direction of
laydown.
Oil spillage is the deterioration or softening of the pavement surface
caused by the spilling of oil, fuel, or other solvents.
A patch is considered a defect, no matter how well it is performing.
Polished aggregate is caused by repeated traffic applications. Polished
aggregate occurs when a portion of aggregate extends above the asphalt and




Raveling and weathering are the wearing away of the pavement surface
caused by the dislodging of aggregate particles and loss of asphalt or tar
binder. They may indicate that the asphalt binder has hardened
significantly
.
Rutting is a surface depression in the wheel path. In many instances ruts
are noticeable only after a rainfall. Rutting stems from a permanent
deformation in any of the pavement layers or subgrade, usually caused by
consolidation or lateral movement of the materials due to traffic loads.
Shoving of a AC pavement occurs when PCC pavements increase in length at
the ends where they adjoin flexible pavements. This increase in length
shoves the asphalt pavement and causes swelling and cracking. The
expansion of the PCC slab is caused by a gradual opening up of the joints
as they are filled with incompressible materials.
Slippage cracks are crescent-shaped cracks having two ends pointed away
from the direction of traffic. They are produced when braking or turning
wheels cause the pavement surface to slide and deform. This usually
occurs when there is a low strength surface mix or poor bond between the
surface and next layer of pavement structure.
195

Swell is characterized by an upward bulge in the pavement's surface. A
swell may occur sharply over a small area or as a longer, gradual wave.
Either type of swell can be accompanied by surface cracking. A swell is
usually caused by frost action in the subgrade or by swelling soil, but a
small swell can also occur on the surface of an asphalt overlay (over PCC)
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